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Introduction
As the global economy sails against stiff headwinds, it is easier to highlight what countries are doing wrong, not what they are doing 
right.  Focusing on sluggish growth or dwindling reserves may yield a compelling indictment of the global economic system, but it offers 
little guidance for improvement. 
We understand that there are problems. It is time we focused on the solutions.
Following the financial crisis of 2008, emerging markets seemed capable of reinvigorating global growth. More recently, developing 
countries have faced trying macroeconomic conditions as the United States tightens monetary policy. 
But the all-too easy grouping “emerging markets” by no means constitutes a cohesive bloc. Countries across the globe may experience 
turbulence, but some have taken steps that will help them weather the storm, and to subsequently emerge as responsible, contributing 
members of the world economy.   
  
Herein lies the importance of the Pacific Pumas. We believe Mexico, Colombia, Peru and Chile are forging a path for Western Hemisphere 
emerging markets that are committed to sound macroeconomic policy, global integration and stronger democratic institutions. 
Their work may be incomplete, but success breeds influence, and their model has proven attractive for a number of other countries in 
the region.  
For over 30 years, the Bertelsmann Foundation and the Bertelsmann Stiftung have developed an expertise in European and trans-
Atlantic issues. In the 21st century, Latin America could play a pivotal role in expanded trans-Atlantic relations, unifying developed 
and developing economies. We began our coverage of Latin America by looking to the past with the 2013 study Surviving a Debt Crisis: 
Five Lessons for Europe from Latin America. Now we turn to the region’s future with the Pacific Pumas—the budding stars of Latin America.    
Bertelsmann Stiftung founder Reinhard Mohn once wrote that the foundation’s projects “could examine ways that would make democracy 
more efficient and capitalism more human”. We believe this is exactly the trend we are discovering in Mexico, Colombia, Peru and Chile. 
To highlight these positives instead of belaboring the pitfalls, we present the The Pacific Pumas: An Emerging Model for Emerging Markets.  
Annette Heuser   Andreas Esche
Executive Director   Director
Bertelsmann Foundation  Bertelsmann Stiftung
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The Puma: 
A powerful, fast, agile, lean and stealthy animal.  
Efficient and resourceful, this New World cat can thrive  
in mountainous highlands and humid rainforests. 
It is a fitting mascot for the emergence  
of Mexico, Colombia, Peru and Chile. 
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The Puma: A powerful, fast, agile, lean and stealthy animal. Efficient and resourceful, this New World cat can thrive in mountainous 
highlands and humid rainforests. 
It is a fitting mascot for the emergence of Mexico, Colombia, Peru and Chile. 
These four countries along Latin America’s west coast have taken great strides in recent years, and they are poised to emerge as regional 
leaders. Like the animal, these Pacific Pumas are comfortable operating quietly, away from the spotlight. But their positive momentum 
is difficult to ignore. 
United in the Pacific Alliance, the Pumas represent more than 200 million people with a US$2.22 trillion GDP; their combined global 
trade accounts for half of the Latin American total, while the depth and breadth of their free-trade agreements have positioned them to 
increase commerce with Europe, the US and Asia. 
This is the story of the advancement of Mexico, Colombia, Peru and Chile—the Pacific Pumas—and of the opportunities they have 
moving forward.  
The text is divided into two sections: 
•  The first section considers the emergence of the Pumas individually. It begins with an overview of the four large Latin American 
countries that have matured economically and politically precisely as their region, the Pacific, has become a cauldron of global 
growth. The second chapter highlights the macroeconomic stability of the four, while the third considers their democratic 
maturation. The section concludes with a chapter on the Pumas’ embrace of globalization, suggesting their preparedness for 
a 21st century economy.
•  The second section analyzes the Pumas’ global opportunities. Through the Pacific Alliance, Mexico, Colombia, Peru and 
Chile can leverage their individual success through a pact large enough to attract international attention. Chapter 5 debates 
the importance of the Alliance, while Chapter 6 considers its ramifications throughout Latin America. Chapter 7 examines 
the importance of the Pumas in greater trans-Atlantic relations, and Chapter 8 reviews the opportunities and challenges the 
Pumas face in dealing with China. 
Together, the two sections outline a golden opportunity for the Pacific Pumas to achieve internal prosperity and stability, while emerging 
as regional leaders and strategic partners of the US, Europe, and East Asia. 
Significant challenges remain: Violence, corruption and inequality still plague parts of these countries, while the four countries’ 
macroeconomic foundations will be tested in the coming years. Yet the text is optimistic, arguing that hard work and propitious timing 
have put the Pumas in a position to finally achieve their potential. 
The Pacific Pumas have much ground to gain, but if they can continue along their current path, they may well be forging an emerging 
model for emerging markets.  
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The Pacific Pumas1
As the world grapples to stimulate 
employment, development and 
innovation, a new club of countries has 
emerged as an engine of regional growth. 
Through sound macroeconomics, 
improved governance, and increased 
global integration, Mexico, Colombia, 
Peru and Chile have rallied in recent 
years. Rather than following the lead 
of their increasingly protectionist and 
interventionist neighbors, these Pacific 
economies have taken their cues from 
the Asian Tigers of the 1980s.1
While global attention has been trained 
on Brazil, the “Pacific Pumas” on 
Latin America’s figurative and literal 
periphery have quietly become economic 
overachievers. This anonymity will be 
short lived. The four countries have 
already spearheaded a regional free 
trade and cooperation pact, the Pacific 
Alliance, which has captured global 
attention. Given the rise of China and 
the US pivot to the East, the Pumas are 
poised to play a significant role in an 
emerging Pacific century.  
Puma economic growth has been strong 
and consistent, averaging 4.69 percent 
annual growth since 2005.2 Setting 
aside 2009, a year of global economic 
tailspin for which Latin America bore 
little responsibility, average annual 
Puma growth nudges above 5.5 percent. 
These figures compare favorably to 
the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) over the same span 
(4.42 percent growth, or 4.80 percent 
excluding 2009).3
This economic performance has 
coincided with rising incomes. The 
Colombian, Chilean and Peruvian middle 
classes each expanded by more than 10 
percent between 2000 and 2010, while 
some estimate that the Mexican middle 
class already accounts for more than half 
the population.4
Inflation, a scourge of Latin American 
development, has been held in check 
across the Puma economies. Strong 
foreign reserves have allowed members to 
assume countercyclical macroeconomic 
positions—a rarity in Latin America. 
Puma sovereigns are investment grade, 
and their issuances are hot. In January 
2013, Mexico issued US$1.5 billion in 
bonds at a yield of 4.2 percent, 110 
basis points higher than comparable US 
Treasuries. Later in the month, Colombia 
issued US$1 billion in bonds at only 
88 basis points above US notes. Both 
issuances were oversubscribed.5
On paper, the Pumas roar. But what 
is driving these figures, and are 
they sustainable? 
THE ANATOMY OF A PUMA
The Puma’s success stems from political 
and macroeconomic stability, an embrace 
of global integration and expanding 
private consumption. 
• Improved Governance
Latin America is notorious for weak 
democratic institutions, short time 
horizons and malleable “rules of the 
game”. Yet, in recent years, the Pumas 
have generally adhered to established 
democratic systems with reasonably 
legitimate elections. The “rules of 
the game” have been observed by 
major political parties, and (Mexico’s 
Andrés Manuel López Obrador aside) 
transitions from right-leaning to left-
leaning executives, and vice versa, have 
been smooth.6
Not only have Puma countries executed 
transitions admirably, but their new 
leaders have accepted existing economic 
and political structures. Countries that 
have bent to the left have done so without 
adopting the statist model popularized 
by Venezuela’s former president Hugo 
Chávez and his Alianza Bolivariana para los 
Pueblos de Nuestra América (ALBA) coalition. 
Countries that have tacked to the right 
have done so without eliminating social 
programs or leaning on the barracks. 
Crucially, Puma central banks have 
maintained the independence required 
to pursue macroeconomic stability. 
• Global Integration
Mexico, Colombia, Peru and Chile 
have aggressively pursued liberalized 
trade, adopting a strategy that proved 
successful in East Asia in order to more 
fully integrate with East Asia. Taking a 
page from ASEAN’s playbook, the Pumas 
have spearheaded more deep-seated 
regional integration. The Pacific Alliance 
has already removed duties on 92 percent 
of inter-Puma trade—a figure scheduled 
to increase to 100 percent within 15 years. 
This is an impressive accomplishment 
for a region where integration has long 
been elusive. 
While the US has concluded free 
trade agreements (FTAs) with Mexico 
(1994), Chile (2004), Peru (2009) and 
Colombia (2012), the Pumas have 
expanded well beyond the Western 
Hemisphere, participating in numerous 
inter-continental trade pacts. Mexico, 
Peru and Chile are members of the 
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation and 
are active negotiators in Trans Pacific 
Partnership (TPP) dialogues. All four 
Pumas have successfully negotiated FTAs 
with the European Union. The Mercado 
Común del Sur (MERCOSUR), an economic 
bloc of mostly Atlantic South American 
countries,7 has not.
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The strategy has paid off. Resource-rich 
Peru and Chile have tapped into East 
Asian growth, providing the raw materials 
that help build that region’s megacities. 
Mexico and Colombia have exploited 
closer commercial ties to the US. All told, 
Puma exports increased by an annual 
average of 4.66 percent (unweighted) 
since 2000 and are forecast to grow six 
percent annually through 2017.8
•  Private Consumption  
and Investment 
Funneling raw materials to global 
superpowers is old hat for the Pacific 
Pumas. However, increases in private 
consumption hint that their recent 
success is rooted in more than simply 
capitalizing on strong commodity prices. 
As poverty decreases and the middle 
class broadens, Puma countries are 
forecast to see private consumption 
expand at an average annual rate of five 
percent over the next six years.9
Mexico, a country of roughly 120 million 
people, has ten cities with more than one 
million inhabitants, and 18 with more 
than 700,000. Colombia (population 46 
million) has four, and nearly five, cities 
with more than one million inhabitants.10 
Multiple, large urban centers portend 
expanded consumption that will be 
buttressed by gross fixed investment, 
forecast to average 8.39 percent annual 
growth across the Puma economies over 
the next six years.11 The emergence of true 
middle classes in these four countries 
will help them expand their economies 
beyond digging things out of the earth 
and shipping them overseas.
THE PUMAS IN A  
GLOBALIZED WORLD
Puma momentum is real, and the 
timing could not be more propitious. 
In the near term, emerging markets 
may face trying macroeconomic 
conditions, but the Pumas’ relative 
fiscal and monetary balance have them 
positioned to withstand the turbulence. 
In the medium and long term, as the 
US and Europe pivot to the east, and as 
emerging Asia shifts up the development 
tables, the Pacific Pumas occupy prime 
real estate in a reconfigured global 
economic ecosystem. 
If Latin America’s west coast was a 
global backyard during the American 
century, it could well be center stage in a 
Pacific century.
The Pumas are already making economic 
and geopolitical waves. United in the 
Pacific Alliance pact, the Pumas together 
are more populous than Brazil. They 
account for roughly 37 percent of Latin 
American GDP and 50 percent of the 
region’s trade. The Mercado Integrado 
Latinoamericano (MILA), the Pumas’ 
shared stock exchange, will be the 
largest in Latin America should Mexico 
join, as expected, in 2014. Smaller Latin 
American countries have taken note. 
Costa Rica has already joined the Pacific 
Alliance, and Guatemala, Panama and 
Uruguay are keen to follow, suggesting 
that the Pumas could emerge as leaders 
in Latin America.
But the Pumas’ strategic influence 
extends beyond the region. For the United 
States, the Pacific Alliance represents 
a key ally in an effort to influence 21st 
century trade. For Europe, where growth 
remains anemic, the Pacific Pumas offer 
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economic opportunities. For Asia, the 
Pumas offer resource security and access 
to market expansion. 
THE OPPORTUNITY OF  
A CENTURY
The Pumas are far from perfect. From 
the urban shanties looming over Ciudad 
Juarez to isolated rural communities 
along the Strait of Magellan, bare feet 
and callused hands do not always square 
with the strong growth figures. The 
optimism in Mexico City is not always 
felt in Chiapas. 
The notion that Mexico is emerging 
from its drug war would be news to 
citizens of Guerrero, where the murder 
rate rivals that of Cote d’Ivoire.12 Chaos 
in neighboring Venezuela fuels the 
perception of a safer Colombia, but 
viewed independently, it can still be a 
dangerous place.13 Peruvian growth is 
in part predicated on fickle commodity 
prices, and its democracy upon a fickle 
electorate. Chile remains saddled with a 
flawed constitution, one of many legacies 
of a painful military dictatorship. 
Significant challenges remain, to be sure.
But the Pacific Pumas have a golden 
opportunity, forged by hard work and 
good timing. Neighboring countries have 
demonstrated that economic bonanzas 
can be easily squandered on subsidized 
gasoline and metro passes. Are the Pacific 
Pumas prepared to run with the Tigers of 
the East? Or will they be ensnared in the 
traps of the past?
The Pumas: Getting to Know You
Country Indicators
Forecasts  
2013- 2018
Rankings
Population
2014 
(Millions)
Population 
Aged 0-14 
(Percent)
Average 
GDP 
Growth 
2004 - 2013 
(Removing 
2009)
Average 
Annual 
Export 
Growth 
2004 - 2013
2013 
Inflation 
(Percent)
Private 
Consumption 
Average 
Annual 
Growth 
(Percent)
Gross Fixed 
Investment 
Average 
Annual 
Growth 
(Percent)
Ease of 
Doing 
Business 
Rank 
(Latin 
America)
Competitiveness 
Rank  
(Latin America)
Macroeconomic 
Environment 
Rank  
(Latin America)
Chile 17.40 21 5.42 3.61 1.73 5.00 6.88 1 1 1
Colombia 46.05 28 5.05 6.59 2.22 4.47 6.43 3 6 4
Mexico 119.41 29 3.39 5.72 3.60 3.58 6.75 4 3 6
Peru 31.42 29 7.28 4.83 2.81 5.43 7.38 2 5 2
Chart Sources: Indicators - IMF Data, World Bank Development Indicators; Forecasts - Economist Intelligence Unit Reports, January 2014.  
Ease of Doing Business Rank – The World Bank; Latin American Competitiveness Rank and Macroeconomic Environment Rank from  
Global Economic Forum’s 2013 - 2014 Global Competitiveness Report.
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The argument in favor of Puma economies 
is about more than growth statistics: Latin 
America has grown before. But previous 
economic expansion has often been built 
upon shaky fundamentals, with those 
in privileged positions accumulating 
as much wealth as possible before the 
entire system collapsed. 
Cycles of Latin American booms and 
busts1 entrenched long-standing and 
flagrant inequality while governments’ 
short time horizons undermined any 
coherent development strategy. In the 
last half century, millions of indigent 
campesinos streamed into Latin American 
cities whose formal job market could 
not adequately absorb them. They made 
their livings in makeshift economies just 
as they made their homes in makeshift 
favelas that tumble down hillsides in 
cities such as Bogotá, Caracas, or 
Rio de Janeiro. 
GDP growth alone cannot fix this. Latin 
America must match expansion with 
long-term macroeconomic stability 
to make that growth inclusive and 
consistent over the long term. 
Mexico, Colombia, Peru and Chile have 
not accomplished this yet. But recent 
trends suggest that they are on their way 
to doing so. The Pacific Puma economies 
have demonstrated consistency, stability 
and resilience despite persistent global 
economic turbulence. Uniquely for the 
region, the Pumas have paired consistent 
growth with low inflation and fiscal 
prudence. They have stoked investment 
and private consumption while also 
making inroads against poverty. 
These developments have rested 
upon three pillars of macroeconomic 
stability: 1) central bank maturity, 
2) floating exchange rates, and 
3) fiscal responsibility. Each is 
considered individually.  
THREE PILLARS OF  
MACROECONOMIC STABILITY
• Central Bank Maturity
Improved central bank performance 
and independence has solidified Puma 
macroeconomic stability. Gone are the 
days of switching on the printing press 
to cover fiscal deficits. Inflation has 
been held within central bank bands 
across the Puma economies.2 Not since 
Mexico in 2009 has annual inflation in 
a Puma country topped five percent, 
and the Andean Pumas have averaged 
2.62 percent since 2010 (besting a 
global average of well over three percent 
through that span).3
Low inflation combined with burgeoning 
reserves (on average, Mexican, 
Colombian, Peruvian and Chilean reserve 
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positions have increased by 80 percent 
just since 20094) have permitted the 
Pumas to assume countercyclical fiscal 
and monetary positions—a rarity in 
Latin America. Chile tapped its sovereign 
wealth fund in 2008 to finance a fiscal 
stimulus, while all four aggressively cut 
base rates during the global financial 
crisis, offering more dovish monetary 
policies that would be risky under 
inflationary pressure. With the exception 
of the Bank of Mexico, they have slowly 
retightened rates as growth rebounded. 
A subtle, more targeted intervention 
approach has helped. The Central Reserve 
Bank of Peru, for example, has increased 
reserve rates on Peruvian banks to curb 
annual credit growth that had exceeded 
20 percent—a more precise intervention 
than blunt base-rate hikes.  
Thanks in large part to central bank 
independence, the Pacific Pumas have 
established the credibility required 
to float their currencies on the open 
market—an important accomplishment 
for mid-sized economies that are 
dedicated to maintaining sovereign 
monetary policy and free flows of capital.
  
• Floating Exchange Rates
Emerging markets have struggled to 
establish successful exchange rate 
regimes since the end of the Bretton 
Woods monetary system in the 1970s. 
Many initially turned to some form 
of a peg—crawling or fixed—in order 
to anchor exchange rates and stymie 
hyperinflation. These pegs proved 
difficult to defend and they often 
unraveled into currency crises both in 
Latin America and in Asia. 
The Pacific Pumas have been early 
adopters of managed currency floats,5 
meaning that domestic currency 
conversion rates are allowed to fluctuate 
based on market impulses. Central banks 
help guide or stabilize movements via 
forex interventions, such as calls or puts 
on US dollars, or swaps that offer hedges 
without committing reserves.
The flexible rates have allowed the Pumas 
to absorb shocks to their real economies, 
perhaps best evidenced during the global 
financial crisis that began in 2008. By 
January 2009, Chilean, Colombian and 
Peruvian currencies had all fallen sharply 
against the dollar as investors rushed 
to perceived safety. Such pressure has 
previously proven disastrous in emerging 
markets where rigid currencies and brittle 
monetary systems ultimately cracked 
under stress. However, with the flexibility 
of the float, Puma central banks were not 
forced to exhaust reserves defending pegs, 
nor were they forced to gamble against 
speculators betting on devaluations. The 
Pumas absorbed the rapid depreciation 
and rebounded swiftly.6
The Pacific Pumas’ mettle will be 
tested as the US begins to unwind easy 
monetary policies forged during the 
global recession. The mere rumor of US 
Federal Reserve “tapering” in August 
2013 led to Mexican and Colombian 
depreciations and general disquiet 
in emerging market currencies. Yet, 
due to strong fundamentals and hard 
fought international credibility, Puma 
currencies have not faced as intense 
pressure as currencies in other major 
emerging markets such as South Africa, 
Turkey and Argentina. Moreover, given 
their ambitions to boost exports, the 
Pumas could well benefit from weaker 
currencies, and their dedication to the 
float is unlikely to waver.7
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Strong reserves have positioned the Pumas to outlast turbulence in currency markets.
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• Fiscal Responsibility
Fiscal responsibility is a tall order for 
growing emerging-market countries. 
Hugo Chávez’s final reelection push 
in Venezuela in 2012 highlighted the 
electoral bounty to be reaped from a 
well-timed stimulus.8 Meanwhile, as 
Chilean President Michelle Bachelet 
found in the years that she nurtured 
Chile’s sovereign wealth fund (2006 – 
2008), fiscal discipline during a boom 
can cause discontent, even within one’s 
own constituency.9
However, the Pacific Pumas have 
demonstrated fiscal restraint through 
their years of growth. Chile has knocked 
public debt below 10 percent of GDP 
and its structural deficit to roughly one 
percent. Meanwhile, it has replenished 
its sovereign wealth funds: Now endowed 
with over US$15 billion,10 the funds 
are more valuable than prior to the 
2008-09 stimulus. 
Peru has flipped a structural deficit into 
a surplus, which it has maintained for 
all but two years since 2006. Colombian 
external debt has dropped from 40 
percent of GDP in 2003 to 22 percent 
today with hard currency reserves nearly 
double their 2009 value.11 Bogotá has 
even codified fiscal discipline with 
legislation that requires a deficit below 
one percent of GDP by 2020, even while 
transfers to conflict victims and at-risk 
groups are expected to increase.12
Mexico remains the fiscal wild card. The 
country’s Finance Ministry reports tax 
intake worth only 9.8 percent of GDP 
in 2012, far less than the Organization 
for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) average of 33 
percent.13 Mexico has leaned on the 
coffers of the state-owned oil company 
Petróleos Mexicanos (PEMEX) to bridge the 
funding gap, but this revenue strategy, 
near-sighted to begin with, may become 
more implausible following the country’s 
energy reforms. 
The Pacto por México, a reform coalition 
spearheaded by President Enrique Peña 
Nieto, did pass a fiscal reform in October 
of 2013 that should increase tax intake, 
but conservatives believe that the reform 
extends the depth of duties paid by the 
existing tax base without increasing the 
breadth of the base—a nettlesome issue 
in a country where many jobs remain off 
the books. The reform also raises taxes 
on Mexico’s manufacturing maquiladora 
sector—a move competitiveness 
specialists question given its sluggish 
growth in 2013.14
All four Pumas will face fiscal tests in 
coming years as citizens’ expectations of 
services to be provided by the state grow. 
Puma governments must find ways to 
improve tax efficiency without negatively 
affecting growth momentum. 
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In an era of debt and stimulus programs, the Pumas have demonstrated impressive fiscal restraint.
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THE (LATIN) AMERICAN 
DREAM: PUMA EMPLOYMENT, 
CONSUMPTION, AND 
INVESTMENT
With this improved macroeconomic 
foundation, the Pacific Pumas have 
fostered a positive environment for 
consumption, investment and business. 
Poverty remains a fact of life for millions 
of citizens in these four countries, as 
it is for billions of people in emerging 
markets around the world. Yet the Pumas 
have made rapid progress in this regard 
as well.  The Colombian poverty rate has 
dipped from 45 percent in 2005 to 34.1 
percent in 2011.15 Peruvian poverty fell 
17 percent between 2006 and 2010,16 and 
Chilean poverty has been cut in half since 
the 1980s. 
Poverty is down throughout the Americas, 
including in the more statist countries of 
the ALBA alliance, such as Venezuela, 
Ecuador and Bolivia. But the Pumas have 
matched ALBA improvements without 
the economic distortions.
As the middle class expands, the Economist 
Intelligence Unit forecasts that the Pumas 
will enjoy five percent annual private 
consumption expansion over the next six 
years, representing a newfound domestic 
growth motor encompassing 214 million 
people.17 Gross fixed investment, 
forecasted to grow 8.39 percent 
annually across the Puma economies 
over the next six years, will buttress 
consumption increases.18 An Alliance-
wide commitment to infrastructure 
could pave the way for foreign direct 
investment, which has steadily increased 
for the Pumas.19
Businesses and investors are taking 
notice: The World Bank’s Doing Business 
report ranked Chile, Peru, Colombia 
and Mexico (in that order), as the 
most business-friendly countries in 
Latin America.20
While much work remains,21 Puma 
economies are humming, poised to 
capitalize on opportunities presented by 
an emerging Pacific Asia while creating a 
roadmap for the rest of Latin America.
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The Pacific Pumas have made inroads against poverty while maintaining a business friendly environment.
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The Pacific Pumas is the story of 
macroeconomic maturation: an emerging 
region’s model for integrating into a 
globalized world. Of crucial importance to 
the narrative, however, are the improved 
democratic governance and institutions 
of Mexico, Colombia, Peru and Chile. 
A country’s governance and economic 
health are mutually dependent, and 
institutional distortions, just like 
economic distortions, can ultimately 
cause a financial system to collapse.1
Puma democracies are imperfect, but 
improved stability, moderation, and a 
commitment to reform differentiates 
them not only from other growing Latin 
American countries, but from many 
emerging markets around the globe 
as well.
Mexico’s 20th-century bureaucratic 
authoritarian government had little time 
for the niceties of democracy, but it was 
not particularly ideological. The PRI may 
be responsible for perpetuating Mexico’s 
deeply ingrained culture of corruption, 
but it is not guilty of polarizing 
the electorate.   
In Colombia, “full electoral competition 
has been unbroken since 1974.”2 
Perhaps owing to the threat of left-wing 
violence, or perhaps as a remnant of 
the 1957 Frente Nacional power-sharing 
agreement, Colombian governance has 
not suffered the ideological vicissitudes 
of its neighbors. Chile, for its part, has 
a long history of compromise-oriented 
democracy dating back to the 19th 
century (with the glaring exception of the 
military dictatorship of 1973 – 1990). 
Peru, with a history of populism, military 
interventions and wild-card presidents,3 
has the most tenuous claim to 
pragmatism of the four. Many feared that 
the ascension of supposedly left-leaning 
President Ollanta Humala in 2011 would 
put Peru on a populist course: The 
Peruvian stock market sank 12.5 percent 
following the election.4 By the end of 
2012, however, the markets had recovered 
and Humala polled favorably among 75 
percent of Peru’s major business leaders, 
even while his national approval rating 
fell below 50 percent.5
 
The Pumas’ moderation not only 
fosters democracies strong enough 
to withstand populist impulses, but 
it enables the private sector to expect 
that the rules of the game will remain 
relatively consistent. 
Individually, Mexico, Colombia, Peru 
and Chile all face different governance 
challenges. A closer look at each case 
highlights both the progress made and 
Political Overview
Current Executive  
(*end of current term) Previous Executive
3+ Democratic 
Elections Since 
2000
Key Issues in 2014
Chile
Michelle Bachelet
Nueva Mayoría (Center Left)
2014-2018*
Sebastián Piñera
Coalición (Center Right)
2010-2014
3
• Potential constitutional reforms
• Resolving student protests
•  Will Bachelet be dedicated to the  
Pacific Alliance?
Colombia
Juan Manuel Santos
Partido de la U (Centrist)
2010-2014*
Álvaro Uribe
Primero Colombia  
(Center Right)
2002-2010
3
• Legislative elections (March)
• Presidential elections (May)
• Ongoing peace negotiations 
Mexico
Enrique Peña Nieto
PRI (Centrist)
2012-2018*
Felipe Calderón
PAN (Center Right)
2006-2012
3
•  Implementation of Energy Reform
•  Can Pacto por Mexico succeed  
without PRD?
•  Can the Mexican left find its voice?
Peru
Ollanta Humala
Gana Perú (Center Left)
2011-2016*
Alan García
APRA (Center / Center Left)
2006-2011
3
• Will Humala lose the left?
• Protests of FDI in Mining Sector
•  Sustaining growth despite  
weakening terms of trade
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remaining tests that must still be met in 
order to unlock the growth potential of 
the Pacific Pumas.
  
THE MEXICAN REFORMS: A 
CRITICAL STEP FORWARD 
Mexico cannot unleash its true economic 
potential until the country addresses the 
bottlenecks that protect vested interests 
but preclude market sophistication. 
Trade policy reforms in the early 1990s6 
positioned Mexico to become a global 
manufacturing hub, but they proved 
incomplete. In particular, sections of 
the service sector—largely unaffected 
by opened borders—survived the 
reforms with inefficiencies intact. With 
an underperforming energy sector, 
inefficient taxation and stifling private-
sector monopolies, Mexico needs a 
reform package with punch.
In his first year at the helm, President 
Enrique Peña Nieto of the centrist PRI 
party has attempted to make up for 
decades of action deferred. His current 
push for reform is an intensely political 
process, with the future of the Mexican 
economy hanging in the balance. The 
process has been turbulent, but it 
appears to be yielding results.
Through his Pacto por México agreement 
of December 2012, President Peña 
Nieto brought the country’s three major 
political parties, PRI, PAN and PRD,7 to 
outline a broad and ambitious agenda 
for fiscal, banking, education, telecom 
and political reforms. While these are 
all important, it is energy reform that 
could prove the crucial springboard for 
Mexican growth. 
Between offshore oil and shale gas, 
Mexico has the resources for an energy 
revolution, but PEMEX, the state-owned 
energy giant, lacks the capacity to fully 
exploit either. Despite massive shale 
gas reserves (the world’s sixth largest, 
according to Duncan Wood of the Wilson 
Center8), PEMEX has been unable to 
meet spiking domestic gas demand. 
With pipelines from the US operating 
at capacity, Mexican gas prices have 
increased just as those across the border 
have dropped precipitously. 
For industry, Mexican oil-based electricity 
runs at roughly twice the price of US gas-
based electricity. Bloated energy costs 
eat away at the price advantages Mexico 
hopes will entice US firms to relocate 
south, threatening Mexico’s hard-fought 
foothold in global manufacturing. A 
successful energy reform9 could attract 
the investment needed to unleash 
the energy revolution in the country’s 
industrial sector. 
On December 12, 2013, the Mexican 
Congress approved an energy bill that will 
open the country’s oil and gas sector to 
international investors. The legislation, 
which proved more investor-friendly than 
initially expected, represented a major 
breakthrough in President Peña Nieto’s 
quest for reform. 
 
The process has not always been 
smooth. Conservative PAN factions and 
business leaders remain bitter about 
fiscal reform, spearheaded by the leftist 
PRD. Meanwhile, the PRD withdrew 
from the Pacto por México in November 
2013, objecting to PAN leadership of 
energy reform.
 
The Pacto’s initiatives are, therefore, no 
faits accomplis. They are multi-step legal 
and political processes that could be 
ambushed by protests that bring Mexico 
City to a grinding halt or vested interests 
willing to fight tooth and nail to protect 
privileged positions. 
 
Nevertheless, the process underscores 
impressive political sophistication. 
President Peña Nieto may be the reform 
movement’s figurehead, but the policy 
proposals are not populist in nature. 
Rather, they are a concerted effort to 
create the institutional foundation 
required to support the weighty potential 
of the Mexican economy. The press might 
refer to the lengthy dialogues between 
parties as “horse trading”, but for 
Mexico—a one-horse country for much 
of the last century—it is evidence of a 
burgeoning democracy. 
THE COLOMBIAN PEACE 
PROCESS: FARC, FISH HEADS 
AND TOADS 
Colombia’s emergence has not been 
hindered by unsophisticated or 
spendthrift economic management,10 but 
rather by the persistent social instability 
that has plagued the country for 
decades and that has displaced roughly 
ten percent of the population.11 From 
guerrillas to paramilitaries to drug cartels 
(and the interconnections between the 
three) the problem has always been the 
violence and the deterring effect this has 
had on private investment, especially 
on long-term infrastructure projects. 
This same violence has also prevented 
Colombia from becoming a truly 
inclusive democracy.12
A lasting peace that extends beyond 
major metropolitan areas is fundamental 
to unlocking Colombia’s growth 
potential. The last two Colombian 
presidents have expended significant 
political capital addressing the lingering 
conflict, though they have chosen sharply 
divergent tactics. President Álvaro Uribe 
(2002 – 2010) confronted the guerrilla 
head-on. His violent military offensive 
punished the largest rebel force, Fuerzas 
Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC), 
halving the faction’s troops and killing a 
number of its influential leaders. 
President Juan Manuel Santos, who took 
office in 2010, seeks to capitalize on the 
rebel’s reduced capacity and influence 
by negotiating a definitive peace accord. 
At first glance, the talks between the 
Colombian government and FARC 
leaders (which have occurred in Havana 
since November 2012) would seem 
unlikely to yield lasting results. After 
all, the FARC’s ideological leaders are 
not believed to have significant control 
over a disjointed guerrilla movement 
that may be more interested in drug 
profits than in the movement’s original 
Marxist principles.   
However, the Havana dialogues are not 
meant to end the violence, at least not 
immediately. Rather, they are geared 
towards establishing peace with the 
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political wing of FARC, thus isolating 
the faction of of the movement that is 
fighting for illicit gains. As of now, the 
two factions are co-dependent. The 
political FARC provides ideological 
legitimacy,13 while the operational FARC 
offers financing, be it through drugs, 
kidnapping or other destructive activity.   
In the 1990s, the Colombian military 
(and paramilitary) attempted to battle 
the FARC by quitando el agua del pez—
draining the water from the fish. In 
practice, this meant locating the guerillas 
and “removing” anything (or anyone) that 
might hide or protect them. This led to 
a spiraling tit-for-tat between different 
armed forces, ultimately rendering 
Colombia one of the most dangerous 
countries on the planet in the 1990s.
The current peace process represents 
a different strategy. Instead of draining 
the water from the fish, the government 
hopes to remove the fish’s head.  If the 
government can make peace with FARC’s 
political wing (its “brain”), this would 
Paseo de la Reforma: Mexican Reforms Under President Peña Nieto
Reform Approval Support Opposition Reforms Goal
Telecom &  
Competition
June 2013 PAN, PRD, PRI
PAN and PRD  
resist PRI efforts to 
protect Televisa
•  Create autonomous regulators  
(IFT & CFCE)
•  Increase competition by auctioning off 
four TV chains
•  Create two free-to-air channels, along 
with a government channel
Economic growth, 
employment,  
and competition
Education September 2013 PAN, PRD, PRI
CNTE (dissident 
teachers’ union) won 
some concessions to 
protect its members
•  Evaluation system based on merit
•  Curb the power of teachers’ unions
•  End the practice of retirees selling or 
passing down their positions
Society of rights
Fiscal October 2013 PRD, PRI
PAN walked out on 
debate, feelign its 
concerns, among 
them increasing VAT 
in northern states, 
were ignored.
•  Establish universal pension system and 
unemployment insurance
•  Increase tax rates for the wealthy  
and corporations
•  Reduce maquiladora reimbursements
Democratic 
governance
Banking November 2013 PAN, PRD, PRI
PRD sought changes, 
but they were struck 
down by PAN and 
PRI
•  Facilitate collection of loan guarantees by 
creating specialized courts
•  Allow banks to register losses in order to 
increase the amount and number of loans 
to SMEs
•  Give government more regulatory power 
over financial firms
Economic growth, 
employment, and 
competition
Political December 2013 PAN, PRD
PRI, but PRI had 
to offer reform to 
entice PAN and PRD 
to join Pacto por 
Mexico
•  End ban on reelection for legislators and 
mayors
•  Allow independent candidates to run for 
public office
•  Replace state elections-monitoring 
institutions with a federal one (INE)
Democratic 
governance
Energy December 2013
PAN, PRI
(PRI allowed 
foreign-contracting 
rather than just 
profit-sharing to win 
PAN back after fiscal 
reform debacle)
PRD opposed 
profit-sharing and 
private or foreign 
contracting and 
pulled out of the 
Pacto por Mexico 
in protest
•  Open oil and gas industry to private and 
foreign investment through cash, profit-
sharing, and production licensing
•  Strips STPRM (Pemex union) of its five 
board member positions
Economic growth, 
employment, and 
competition
Source: Bertelsmann Foundation, The Economist, EL Universal, Reuters, Forbes, LA Times
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undermine the group’s justification 
for continued conflict. The remaining 
“gangster” element of FARC, now lacking 
ideological support, would be isolated, 
exposed, and doggedly pursued.
An eventual peace deal might well 
guarantee political participation for the 
former rebel combatants based on a quota 
system (the country already reserves two 
senate seats for representatives from 
the country’s indigenous communities, 
and two lower house seats for 
Afro-Colombians).
 
The plan is contingent upon the 
Colombian right accepting the left into 
the democratic sphere, by no means 
a given. In February 2014, Semana, a 
Colombian weekly, offered evidence that 
the Colombian military—independent 
of the government—was spying on 
the peace talks.14 That same month 
two prominent left-leaning politicians 
received death threats from shadowy 
paramilitary organizations.15
The Colombian phrase tragar un zapo 
(swallow a toad) might translate into 
English as “a tough pill to swallow”. By 
offering institutional legitimacy and 
political inclusion to FARC leaders 
in Havana, Colombian officials are 
swallowing toads by the handful. But 
once Colombia can achieve what has 
been an elusive peace, it can then begin 
to flex its economic muscles. 
CHILEAN DEMOCRACY: 
UNFINISHED BUSINESS
On March 11, 2014, Michelle Bachelet 
donned Chile’s presidential sash for a 
second time after having handily won a 
December 15 run-off election (Bachelet 
previously served as president from 2006 
– 2010). According to her 2013 electoral 
platform, she will focus on education, 
tax reform and adjustments to—if not 
an outright overhaul of—the Chilean 
constitution. The three objectives are 
intertwined, and they reflect Chile’s 
25-year effort to responsibly reform a 
severely flawed document.
Forged under General Augusto Pinochet’s 
military dictatorship (1973–1990), Chile’s 
1980 constitution carved out a series of 
authoritarian enclaves, designed to allow 
General Pinochet to cloak his heavy-
handed rule in the guise of democracy.16 
With an influential, unchecked 
military presence, weak legislature, 
concentrated presidential powers, 
and a binomial electoral system that 
ensured disproportionate conservative 
representation, Pinochet’s constitution 
hardly provided a bedrock for Latin 
America’s most advanced democracy.
Much to Chile’s credit, however, 
subsequent governments did not 
attempt to delegitimize this constitution 
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Timeline – The Colombian Peace Process
1948 - 57 1960s - 1990s 1998 2000 2001 2002
•  250,000-300,000 
killed in “La Violencia”, 
a 10-year civil war 
between conservatives 
and liberals. In 1958, 
both sides agree to 
form the National 
Front and ban all  
other parties.
•  Many of Colombia’s 
left- and right-wing 
extremist groups form. 
Political violence and 
assassinations are 
prevalent. Efforts to 
integrate FARC into 
politics are ineffective.
•  Conservative President 
Andres Pastrana 
Arango grants FARC 
a safe haven the size 
of Switzerland in the 
south-east as part of 
peace talks. The zone is 
off-limits to the army.
•  Pastrana’s “Plan 
Colombia” wins bilions 
in mainly military aid 
from the US to fight 
drug-trafficking and 
rebels who profit and 
protect the trade. 
Peace talks deteriorate.
•  Government, FARC 
sign San Francisco 
agreement, 
committing both to 
negotiate ceasefire.
• Indpendent Alvaro 
Uribe assumes 
presidency, promising 
to crack down on rebel 
groups. As Uribe is 
sworn in, explosions 
rock Bogota.
Uribe’s first term: 2002 - 2006 Uribe’s second term: 2006 - 2010 Santos’ first term: 2010 - present
•  Uribe carries out aggressive military campaign 
against FARC, pushing guerrillas out of towns 
and back into rural areas.
•  New law offers reduced punishment for 
paramilitaries who turn in their arms. Rights 
groups say the legislation is too lenient.
• Uribistas win overwhelming electoral victories.
•  Uribe continues heavy-handed campaign, 
including a cross-border strike in Ecuador that 
sparks diplomatic crises with Ecuador and 
Venezuela.
•  Colombia extradites 14 paramilitary warlords to 
the United States.
•  Juan Manuel Santos, Uribe’s former Defense 
Minister, elected president.
• FARC unlitaterally releases several hostages.
•  Santos opens exploratory talks with FARC 
guerrillas.
•  Uribe accuses Santos of “giving impunity to 
terrorists”.
November 2012 - May 2013 May 2013 - November 2013 November 28 - Present
• Havana discussions begin.
•  Early topics include land access, rural 
development, infrastructure, poverty reduction, 
and agrarian stimulus.
•  Agreement on these topics reached in  
May 2013.
•  Parties open discussions on political participation.
•  Topics include improved access to media, regional 
“Councils for Reconciliation and Coexistence”, 
changes to ease the formation of political parties.
•  Parties reach agreements on these topics in 
November 2013.
•  Seventeenth round begins. Both parties agree 
to postpone the contentious topics (ending 
the conflict/demobilization and transnational 
justice) and move to addressing international 
drugs.
Source: BBC America, ColombiaPeace.org
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outright—an approach that would 
have likely interrupted the country’s 
steady economic growth. Rather, 
iterations of the center-left Concertación 
government (1990–2010) methodically 
reformed the document, often in close 
consultation with the private sector and 
the political opposition. All told, the 
original constitution has undergone 
131 amendments, affecting 79 of its 
120 articles.17
The current Bachelet government 
appears poised to address the remaining 
deficiencies instilled by the Pinochet 
government as well as the growing 
pains of a country transitioning to 
the developed world while still facing 
persistent inequality. If these changes 
can promote upward mobility and a more 
inclusive democracy, they will bolster the 
country’s economic rise.
But Chile must come to terms with 
student protesters, whose strikes have 
intermittently shut down schools and 
immobilized streets since 2006. The 
students balk at Pinochet-era education 
laws that favor affluent pupils18 and 
university fees that reach US$1000 
monthly. Bachelet’s platform proposes 
full subsidization of public universities 
within six years (though this would not 
address the flawed high school model). 
She would pay for this by increasing 
corporate tax rates from 20 to 25 percent, 
still far below the weighted OECD average 
of just roughly 35 percent.19
Bachelet’s efforts to improve democratic 
inclusiveness are equally important. 
Following the Pinochet years, Chile’s 
vulnerable and nascent democracy took 
a cautious, centrist approach. Twenty-
five years later, this method threatens to 
ossify the political process. The country’s 
curious binomial election system 
stipulates that each congressional 
district must split its two seats between 
the first and second-place parties, unless 
one of the two can garner two-thirds of 
the vote—a relative rarity.
This system disincentivizes participation 
because split districts are the most likely 
outcome—one reason more and more 
Chileans are not bothering to go to the 
polls.  If it’s a foregone conclusion that 
one liberal and one conservative will 
win, why vote? In fact, only 50 percent of 
eligible Chileans voted in last November’s 
general election.20 Bachelet will seek 
to reform the binomial system, though 
this will require politicking because her 
coalition lacks the congressional 3/5 
quorum required to change it.21
Finally, Bachelet’s incorporation of 
former student leaders and more 
leftist factions into her Nueva Mayoría 
coalition is an important step forward 
for Chile. While some22 view this as a 
concerning leftward veer, it is far better 
to incorporate these elements into the 
formal political dialogue than to exclude 
them from it. A century of repression has 
not eliminated the Chilean left. Far better 
to have leftists participate in Chile’s 
democracia de los acuerdos (democracy based 
on agreement), rather than to have them 
battling against it.
PERU: THE MATURATION OF  
A PUMA CUB
Peru earns its stripes based on economic 
performance and an openness to trade 
that has positioned it to capitalize 
on Asia’s rise. In terms of democracy, 
however, this Pacific Puma still has some 
growing up to do.23
The country has taken important 
strides. Peru has held three successful 
presidential elections since the ousting 
of the semi-authoritarian Alberto 
Fujimori (1990 - 2000), and the winners of 
those elections have generally followed 
the rules of the game. Peru has executed 
party transitions: Three different political 
coalitions have led 21st century Peru. 
The Road to Redemption: Chilean Constitutional Reforms Since 1989
Year Reformer (Party) Reforms
1989 Military government & Concertación 
de Partidos por la Democracia
• Limited penalization of groups previously viewed as subversive
•  Increased number of elected senators and added civilian member to 
National Security Council
• Modified constitutional amendment mechanism
• Removed president’s ability to dissolve lower house
2005
President Ricardo Lagos  
(Concertación); Supported by 
Conservative Senators
• Cut presidential term from six years to four years
•  Eliminated ten unelected senate seats reserved for military- 
affiliated personnel
• Eliminated several prerogatives of the armed forces and police chief
• Increased power of congress
2014
(potential)
President Michelle Bachelet 
(Nueva Mayoría)
• Revise binomial electoral system
• Address high-majority requirement for educational reforms
• Inclusion of rights for women and indigenous groups
• Extend presidential term limit from four years or allow consecutive terms
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The first two presidents respected 
a constitutional ban on immediate 
reelection, and current President 
Ollanta Humala, who took office in 2011, 
has promised to do the same.24 Two 
successive presidents have run on left-
leaning platforms without subsequently 
dismantling Peru’s free-market economy, 
suggesting an important modicum of 
stability in Lima.
Nevertheless, the country’s political 
system remains rudimentary. In contrast 
to Mexico, Colombia and Chile, political 
volatility has been a norm in Peru. The 
country suffered eight coups in the 20th 
century, while presidents averaged less 
than three and a half years in office. 
A more recent consequence of this 
instability has been the diminished 
importance of political parties. Beginning 
with Fujimori’s “anti-political” campaign 
in 1990, Peruvian presidents have built 
political parties as short-term vehicles 
they could ride to power.25  These rickety 
coalitions that lack philosophical 
underpinnings are subsequently held 
together by the meting out of sinecures 
and favors.
Operating without a strong party 
foundation, Peruvian presidents have 
struggled to pursue a coherent direction. 
For example, President Humala governs 
to the right of how he campaigned. 
Business may breathe a sigh of relief, 
but voters who backed the president 
based on his left-leaning platform feel 
duped.26 Without any defined governing 
philosophy, Peruvian presidents’ 
personal exploits (and foibles) attract 
more attention than reform packages. 
These factors have inhibited the 
country’s ability to fully translate growth 
into tangible improvements—one reason 
why the approval ratings of the last four 
presidents have deteriorated through the 
course of their presidencies.
Peru’s economy has benefited from 
buoyant Asian commodity demand. To 
manage this windfall—and, ultimately, to 
manage after the windfall—the country’s 
democracy must improve. Successful 
elections and transitions represent an 
important step forward. But until there 
is more institutional stability, Peruvian 
politics remain something of a crapshoot, 
threatening to turn the current economic 
winning streak into a bust. 
MOVING FORWARD
Puma democratic gains are not 
irreversible. The December 9, 2013 sacking 
of Bogota’s left-leaning Mayor Gustavo 
Petro by a right-leaning inspector general 
on rather flimsy grounds underscores 
the tenuousness of Puma institutional 
stability.  We have yet to see if an elected, 
left-leaning Colombian or Mexican 
executive would adhere to existing 
frameworks. But all democratic systems 
in the world suffer from significant 
flaws. Deficiencies notwithstanding, 
the democratic conditions in Mexico, 
Colombia, Peru and Chile have become 
increasingly stable, and the rules of the 
game increasingly clear and reliable. 
These improvements have helped 
position the Pumas to become regional 
leaders. Most of Latin America may 
be growing, but it is the Pumas, along 
with Pumitas such as Uruguay and Costa 
Rica, that are simultaneously maturing 
politically. Mexico may have similar 2013 
growth figures to those of Venezuela, but 
if the Mexican reforms are successful, 
it will be well positioned for consistent 
future growth, while Venezuela will be 
but one day closer to its reckoning. 
Brazil’s market size swamps that of 
Colombia or Peru, but investors may tire 
of the Custo Brasil, the implicit operational 
cost of trying to do business in that 
country, and they will be enticed by the 
Pumas’ business-friendly governance. 
Argentina maintains its perennial growth 
potential, but unpredictable rules of the 
game hinder firms’ and families’ ability to 
plan for the future—something that can 
be done with relative confidence across 
the Andes in Chile.  
Puma democratic maturity can compare 
favorably to governance in emerging 
Asian countries as well, where the heavy 
hand of the state in countries such as 
China or Vietnam could face increased 
social backlash in coming years.
Improved Puma governance may not 
appear in any given year’s growth charts, 
but over time it will create conditions 
that could allow strong performance to 
be sustained in the future.  
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If geography is destiny, Pacific Latin 
America is not a bad place to be in the 
early 21st century. East Asia has emerged 
as a cauldron of global growth and 
trade, while the US and Canada remain 
economic powerhouses and hubs of 
innovation.  Colombia, Peru, Chile and 
Mexico have the good fortune of both 
having direct access to the Pacific’s 
intricate web of supply chains and of 
possessing the raw inputs—the copper, 
iron ore, and hydrocarbons—that are so 
valuable to emerging East Asia.
Much of Latin America has benefited 
from strong commodity prices over the 
last ten years. What differentiates the 
Pumas is their effort to create deeper 
linkages, with both traditional trans-
Atlantic partners and emerging Asian 
partners. The statistics suggest the effort 
has been successful: The Pumas have 
averaged 4.7 percent annual growth in 
exports since 2001, and the IMF forecasts 
Puma exports to grow six percent 
annually through 2017.1
But trade liberalization, itself, is no 
panacea, and export-led growth raises a 
host of challenges. The Andean Pumas, 
with resource-heavy export portfolios, 
must avoid the looming pitfalls of 
commodity reliance. Mexico, on the 
other hand, must encourage the rise of its 
manufacturing sector while addressing 
the gap between winners and losers 
of trade. 
This chapter begins with an overview 
of Puma integration, featuring Mexican 
and Chilean case studies. The chapter 
concludes by considering the challenges 
the Pumas face in their pursuit 
of integration.  
PUMA TRADE IN A 
GLOBALIZED WORLD 
The Pumas’ embrace of trade began 
mostly in the 1980s and 1990s, when 
many Latin American countries lifted 
tariff and regulatory barriers that had 
been designed to protect domestic 
industries.2 Unilateral reforms eventually 
led to a “surge” in trade, especially with 
non-traditional partners in East Asia.3 
More recently, the Pumas have been 
active participants in bilateral and 
multilateral free trade agreements. They 
have aligned with those countries seeking 
to accomplish bilaterally and regionally 
Puma Integration:
Running with the Tigers
4
Puma Free Trade Agreements with Major Economies
Chile Colombia Mexico Peru
Australia FTA (2009) FTA (proposed) FTA (under negotiation through TPP)
FTA (under negotiation 
through TPP)
Canada FTA (1997) FTA (2011) FTA (1994 - NAFTA) FTA (2009)
China FTA (2006) FTA (2010)
EU FTA (2003) FTA (2013) FTA (2000) FTA (2013)
India PTA (2007) PTA (proposed)
Japan EPA (2007) FTA (proposed) EPA (2005) FTA (2012)
South Korea FTA (2004) FTA (signed in 2013, not in force) SECA (under negotiation) FTA (2011)
Thailand FTA (signed in 2013,  but not in force) FTA (2011)
US FTA (2004) FTA (2012) FTA (1994 - NAFTA) FTA (2009)
Vietnam FTA (signed 2011,  but not in force)
FTA (under negotiation 
through TPP)
FTA (under negotiation 
through TPP
Assisting Sources: Inter-American Development Bank, Barbara Kotschwar
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what the World Trade Organization has 
been unable to accomplish globally: 
free trade. 
Some fear that these types of agreements 
could lead to trade regionalism, but the 
Pumas have used them to forge linkages 
all over the world. All four have signed 
FTAs with the US, Canada, and the EU, 
while simultaneously integrating into 
East Asia’s “noodle bowl” of pacts. China, 
Japan, South Korea, Singapore and India 
have all concluded agreements with at 
least two of the Pumas. 
Many of the deals go well beyond simply 
liberalizing trade in goods. They also 
include “comprehensive provisions on 
services…intellectual property rights…
investment, government procurement, 
trade facilitation and competition”.4 
The Korea-Peru and Australia-Chile 
agreements are considered “the gold 
standard of FTAs”.5
Efforts to integrate into global trade have 
paid off. Spurred by strong copper prices, 
Chilean trade with China increased from 
US$1.34 billion in 2000 to US$17.94 
billion in 2012 (the two signed a free trade 
agreement in 2006).6 Peruvian exports 
to China increased 42 percent between 
2010 and 2012, due at least in part to the 
Peru-China Free Trade Agreement that 
came into effect in 2010.7 Mexican trade 
with the US increased more than 500 
percent in the first 20 years of NAFTA,8 
while Colombian exports are up nearly 
50 percent just since 2010.9
This integration, in both the Atlantic 
and Pacific, has primed the Pumas for 
the world’s future trade ecosystem. 
With the WTO’s Doha Round stalled, 
the globe’s foremost trade initiatives 
are the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), 
which focuses mostly on reducing tariffs 
and harmonizing regulations in Pacific 
Rim countries, and the Trans-Atlantic 
Trade and Investment Pact (TTIP), which 
intends to harmonize EU-US trade 
regulations. These deals represent 38 
and 40 percent, respectively, of global 
GDP, and they could well set the standard 
for 21st century trade. 
Mexico, Peru and Chile are already 
participants in TPP dialogues. Colombia, 
withheld from TPP on a technicality,10 can 
ensure that its voice is heard, and that its 
regulatory and tariff standards are up to 
snuff, through Pacific Alliance dialogues. 
The Pumas, and Mexico in particular, are 
concerned that they cannot participate in 
TTIP dialogues, which have been limited 
to US and EU participants (see Chapter 
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US China EU
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US China EU
Japan South Korea Other
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US China EU
Panama Venezula Other
US EU China
China Colombia Other
US EU Canada
Switzerland Canada Other
EU China US
Colombia
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7). Nevertheless, the Pumas’ pre-existing 
pacts and ongoing discussions with the 
EU and the US can help ensure that their 
regulations match those enumerated in 
any future TTIP deal.   
Alternatively, countries not party to 
either pact (the four BRICs—Brazil, 
China, India, and Russia—stand out in 
this regard) could find themselves either 
isolated or pressured to subsequently 
join a pact they did not help design.  
PUMA TRAPS: BEATING 
RESOURCE RELIANCE
Puma trade may be rapidly increasing, 
but the infamous commodity trap looms. 
The Pumas—Chile, Peru and Colombia in 
particular—have greatly benefited from 
the highest crude oil and metal prices 
observed since World War II.17 There 
is no shortage of pundits arguing that 
their recent growth is predicated solely 
on strong commodity prices. Should 
these falter, the argument continues, 
so too would Puma progress. Even if 
prices remain strong, overreliance on 
commodity exports threatens to prevent 
the linkages the Pumas need to expand 
beyond resource reliance. 
Basic theory of supply and demand 
suggests that commodity prices may 
soon come back down to earth. On the 
one hand, demand may be in decline. 
As Chinese growth tapers, and as OECD 
demand for Chinese goods remains 
sluggish, the country no longer stockpiles 
copper and ore reserves, instead pursuing 
a “hand-to-mouth” buying pattern.18 On 
the other hand, commodity supply has 
increased. New investments inspired by 
boom-era prices are only now coming 
online, portending expanded supply. 
Credit Suisse forecasts that global copper 
production will increase four percent 
annually between 2012 and 2015, leading 
the investment bank to conclude that 
“copper scarcity is a thing of the past”.19
The writing is already on the wall. 
Between 2011 and mid-2013, global 
copper prices fell 35 percent, iron ore 
40 percent, and gold 36 percent. Mineral 
shipments leaving Peru’s Callao port 
CASE STUDY A
The Mexican Model: Becoming a hub
Notwithstanding Chile’s rash brush with neoliberalism in the 1970s, Latin 
America’s true shift from protectionism began in 1985 with Mexico’s ascension 
to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). It continued in 1994 with 
the North American Free Trade Association (NAFTA). Today Mexico has free trade 
agreements with 44 countries; that is more than twice as many as China and four 
times more than Brazil.11
These agreements coincided with sharp increases in Mexican trade: In 1985, the 
volume of Mexican exports totaled just 27.6 percent of its 1995 value. By 2000, 
Mexico exported double the 1995 volume.12 Mexico subsequently doubled the 
value of its exports again between 2000 and 2010. Along the way, the country 
established itself as Latin America’s manufacturing capital, exporting more of such 
goods than the rest of the region combined13—a point of interest to other Pumas 
hoping to expand in this sector.
Mexico’s embrace of free trade helped fuel the sector’s emergence for two reasons: 
First, it precipitated swift increases in foreign direct investment. Attracted by 
newfound ease in moving products across the border into the US, international 
firms outsourced tasks along the value chain to Mexico before importing finished 
(or nearly finished) products north. From 1980 through the advent of NAFTA on 
January 1, 1994, Mexico averaged just US$2.6 billion in net FDI inflows. From 1994 
through 2012, that average jumped to nearly US$19 billion.14
This investment has radically influenced Mexico’s export portfolio. In the 1980s, 
hydrocarbons accounted for 61 percent of Mexican exports. By 2012, manufactured 
goods represented a full 81 percent of Mexican exports.15 The FDI has also induced 
knowledge spillover, and Mexico has advanced in high-tech goods: It is the world’s 
preeminent exporter of flat-screen TVs, and a major producer of domestic and 
medical appliances. 
Secondly, liberalized trade forced efficiency improvements. International 
competition pushed previously coddled producers towards reforms that would 
otherwise be difficult and time consuming to legislate. Forced to compete with 
China, domestic firms had to sink or swim as China cut into Mexico’s manufacturing 
exports to the US after joining the WTO in 2001. Twelve years later, Mexico has 
taken significant strides towards closing the productivity gap with the Asian giant 
(an effort assisted by increased Chinese wages and trans-Pacific transportation 
costs), and has nearly recovered its share of manufacturing exports.
While Peru and Colombia may look to the Mexican blueprint to establish their own 
industrial sectors, the Mexican model has also encountered some of the pitfalls 
of global integration, particularly an emerging gap between winners and losers of 
trade. Within firms, wages remain stubbornly low—a boon for owners of capital, 
but a burden for labor. Between firms, larger multinationals have been able to 
capitalize on FTAs and foreign investment; smaller (often informal) firms have not. 
Nationally, Mexico’s manufacturing sector is concentrated in the north, a region 
whose growth has far outpaced the more rural south.16
Moving forward, Mexico must ensure that more firms are exposed to the benefits of 
liberalized trade. If it does not, and if existing inequality persists, there will almost 
certainly be a backlash to Mexico’s model for integration.     
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were down 12 percent through the first 
six months of 2013.20 
Yet the unwinding of the boom need not 
be cataclysmic. For one thing, commodity 
exports will not disappear overnight. 
Chinese growth may decline, but seven 
percent annual growth over the next 
five years (as forecast by the IMF) is not 
exactly a depression. Moreover, demand 
from other resource-starved Asian 
countries will likely increase. Between 
2000 and 2010, mineral imports to India, 
Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand all 
averaged more than 20 percent annual 
growth.21 Even the bearish forecasts have 
copper prices above the average price 
between 2003 and 2008, which were years 
of strong growth for Chile and Peru.22
 
In terms of linkages, conventional wisdom 
holds that commodity exports generate 
few forward and backward employment 
opportunities. Where raw resources 
are simply withdrawn from the earth 
and shipped abroad, few “downstream” 
jobs are created, little technology is 
needed and a country does not cultivate 
spillover knowledge.23
CASE STUDY B
The Chilean Model:  Export Diversification
Chile is another Latin American veteran of liberalized trade, having experimented 
with reduced tariffs since 1974. In the early 1970s, Chile remained fortified behind 
import substitution industrialization (ISI) policies. Luxury goods faced tariffs as 
high as 750 percent and all imports required administrative approval.26 The country 
rapidly embraced global markets following the 1973 coup d’état, but the rigid 
neoliberalism implemented by the military junta led to falling real wages, soaring 
unemployment and a soft underbelly of corporate debt—vulnerabilities exposed 
in 1982 when 800 firms filed for bankruptcy and GDP contracted by 14 percent.27
Beginning in the mid-1980s, however, Santiago adopted a more measured tack 
towards real integration. Marked by a steady decrease in tariffs (from 15 percent 
in 1988 to near 3 percent in 2010),28 a propensity for bilateral trade agreements, 
and a concerted effort to develop non-traditional exports, these policies led to two 
decades of sustained growth, including during the years that predated the booming 
commodity prices of the 2000s.   
Crucially, Chile’s opening led to a blossoming of non-traditional exports. At 
the farm level, Chileans have long held comparative advantages in production. 
However, not until the country pursued more liberal trade did producers of wine, 
fruit and fish have access to external markets and equipment inputs, as well as the 
competitive exchange rate needed to trade internationally.29
The emergence of Chilean wine is a testament to the model’s success. Wine, which 
began the 1990s accounting for roughly one percent of Chile’s non-copper exports, 
finished the decade at nearly six percent.  Presently, Chile is the world’s seventh 
largest wine producer, after nearly doubling exports in 2012.  
As Chilean viticulture improved, foreign capital poured into the sector. Simply 
between 1995 and 2000, wine-related FDI equaled 14 times the 1990-1994 value. In 
some cases, European firms opened joint ventures with Chilean producers—one 
reason that the award-winning Concha y Toro’s wine is now sold in at least 135 
countries.30
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But perhaps this is an over-
simplification.24  As with industrial goods, 
commodities pass through a series of 
production phases as they are refined, for 
example, from iron ore to steel or from 
oil to gasoline. This process requires 
advanced technology. The problem is 
that the technology has historically been 
housed elsewhere. For example, Chile, 
the world’s largest producer of copper, 
builds only one percent of the world’s 
fabricated copper products.25 Mexico 
exports crude oil to the US and imports 
refined fuel.  
As the Pumas develop internal investment 
muscle, and as they continue to earn 
the faith of international developers, 
more downstream linkages could occur 
domestically. Chile has already set the 
stage, moving from an imitator to an 
innovator in exporting wood pulp and 
wine (as opposed to logs and grapes). If 
the other Pumas can follow suit, perhaps 
natural resources can be a foundation 
for an expanding economic ecosystem, 
as opposed to the first and last words in 
Latin American development.  
PREPARING POST-BOOM 
ECONOMIES
The Pumas understand that booming 
commodity prices may not last forever, 
and even if they did, simple raw resource 
exports are unlikely to generate holistic 
development. Thus, Mexico, Colombia, 
Peru and Chile are attempting to achieve 
deep integration both regionally and with 
the global economic hubs in the Atlantic 
and Pacific with the goal of establishing 
niches in trade networks and supply 
chains beyond commodities.  
Executing the strategy, however, requires 
far more than signing as many free trade 
deals as possible. The Pumas must 
make sure that the benefits of export-led 
growth are more evenly spread. Improved 
infrastructure is a good place to start. 
All four countries face unforgiving 
topography, and as a result, in-country 
transportation from remote regions 
to exit points implies great expense. 
Colombia, for example, does not have 
the domestic transport system required 
to conduct major trade with East Asia: It 
is three times more expensive to ship a 
container from Bogotá to the Caribbean 
port of Barranquilla than it is to ship 
the same container from Barranquilla to 
Hong Kong.31  
An Inter-American Development 
Bank study32 coordinated by Mauricio 
Mesquita Moreira estimates notable 
export increases for all four countries 
with even just a one percent decrease 
in in-country transportation costs. The 
study forecasts 7.8 percent expansion 
of manufacturing exports in Colombia. 
In Mexico, the study found that the one 
percent reduction in transportation costs 
in the south could lead to a five percent 
increase in total exports. In Peru and 
Chile, where pockets of the population 
in remote areas struggle to integrate 
into trade networks, the study found that 
agricultural, mining and manufacturing 
exports would all expand roughly four 
percent with a one percent decrease in 
internal transportation costs. 
The region’s flawed efforts to liberalize 
in the 1990s remain a bitter memory. 
“Washington Consensus” is a pejorative 
term for many in Latin America. But 
globalization will not disappear, and the 
Pacific Pumas are preparing to capitalize 
from it. For the model to take hold, all four 
Pumas must focus not only on enlarging 
the proverbial pie, but also ensuring that 
more people get forks as well.
If Mexico, Colombia, Peru and Chile 
can do this, their macroeconomic 
and political stability will be 
matched by consistent growth in the 
forseeable future.
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Currently, Puma export production is concentrated regionally. The Pumas must work to ensure that the entire country can benefit from an  
export-oriented trade strategy
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To this point, this paper has focused on 
the advancements of Mexico, Colombia, 
Peru and Chile individually. However, 
these countries’ shared democratic 
improvements, macroeconomic stability 
and openness to trade make them natural 
partners, thus leveraging their power in a 
globalized world. Via the Pacific Alliance, 
the Pumas have added gravitas to their 
individual momentum and established 
their model as an attractive approach 
for many smaller and mid-sized Latin 
American countries. 
Much like their European relatives, Latin 
American leaders have a sweet tooth 
for the summit, the annual meeting 
and the commission. Lofty goals and 
promises of solidarity are sealed with 
vigorous handshakes, bear hugs and 
kisses on the cheek. But beyond the 
ubiquitous photos of smiling presidents, 
few concrete achievements emerge from 
these gatherings.
In theory, inchoate integration projects 
abound, from the regional MERCOSUR 
to the continental Union of South 
American Nations (UNASUR). In fact, the 
dream of a more unified Latin America 
has progressed little since Simon Bolívar 
crisscrossed the Andes in the early 
19th century. 
This could be changing.
The Pacific Alliance, a trade and 
integration bloc conceived in April 2011 
and launched in June 2012, originally 
consisted of the four Pacific Pumas. 
The Alliance is a natural collaboration 
between like-minded countries that have 
independently developed similar reforms 
and strategies, with an eye towards the 
East as both a trading partner and a 
model for development. 
Through the Alliance, the Pacific Pumas 
do not seek reform. Rather, they hope to 
amplify existing reform and to synergize 
integration efforts in both the regional 
and global economy. For those in the 
Western Hemisphere (north and south) 
anxious to establish an alternative to the 
Atlantic-Latin American development 
model, the Pacific Alliance is the most 
exciting thing happening in the region.1
THE PACIFIC ALLIANCE
Viewed as a unit, the Pacific Alliance 
converts a series of small to mid-sized 
economies into a global force. With 221 
million people (counting Costa Rica),2 
The Pacific Alliance: 
A Gathering of the Pumas
5
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the bloc would supplant Brazil as the 
world’s fifth most populous country, while 
a collective GDP of US$2.219 trillion—
roughly 37 percent of the regional total3
—would place ninth globally. The 
Alliance’s combined global trade, 
US$1.045 trillion, accounts for 50 percent 
of Latin America’s total.4
The Pacific Alliance is a residual of the 
larger Arc of the Pacific pact launched 
in 2007 that featured 11 Latin American 
countries along the continent’s west 
coast.5 The Arc, itself, features a number 
of holdovers from the habitually 
underperforming Andean Community of 
Nations (CAN), founded in 1969.6
With each successive pact, the inner 
core whittled away countries that did 
not share an open-market strategy.7 
As a result, Alliance members have a 
shared vision of economic development 
that eased a path for tangible results 
where regional, hemispheric and global 
multilateral trade dialogues have stalled.
As of June 2013, an agreement following 
the seventh Pacific Alliance Presidential 
Meetings in Cali removed all tariffs on 
91.8 percent of inter-bloc merchandise 
trade, with the additional 8.2 percent 
to be liberalized incrementally over the 
next 15 years.8 This agreement made 
international headlines, but leaders 
from the participating countries were 
just as apt to stress the non-trade 
elements of the Alliance, such as 
shared embassies around the world, 
waived visa requirements and unified 
maritime and aerial services. In February 
2014, presidents of the four countries 
announced that the Alliance will 
share a fund to finance infrastructure 
investments.9 In fact, the largest initial 
economic gains from the Pacific Alliance 
are likely to result from the liberalization 
of capital, not from trade.   
For Mexico, the Alliance represents 
reintegration into Latin America 
following two decades of close 
association with the United States and 
Canada via NAFTA. For Colombia, slowly 
emerging from a long period of violence, 
the Alliance offers an opportunity to 
engage as a regional player—something 
that the country’s population, GDP and 
sound macroeconomic management 
suggests it could be. Peru, meanwhile, 
earns a measure of legitimacy from 
its participation in the Alliance. For a 
world that associates Peru with poverty, 
hyperinflation and exotic vacations, 
the Alliance offers a rebranding 
opportunity. For Chile, a sophisticated 
but small country, the Alliance allows 
for a projection of influence and an 
opportunity to emerge as a leader in 
Latin America.
A PUBLICITY STUNT? 
To the seasoned Latin Americanist, 
perhaps numbed by the steady diet 
of short-circuited regional pacts, the 
excitement over the Pacific Alliance can 
seem disproportionate. After all, the 
members already shared bilateral free-
trade agreements with each other prior 
to the Alliance, and they already had 
bilateral agreements with the US and 
the EU. Numerous Puma agreements 
with East Asia are already tangled into 
the latter’s rich network of trade pacts. 
Moreover, they are not even major 
trading partners with each other: As of 
2012, neither Mexico, Chile nor Peru 
counted a Puma country as a top five 
trading partner.10
For one, the Pumas do not exactly have 
compatible export portfolios. Chile will 
not get far trying to export copper to 
Peru—itself a major copper producer. 
Secondly, poor coastal infrastructure 
and sheer distance do not portend 
smooth, cost effective supply chains. 
Given these issues, some consider the 
bloc little more than a publicity stunt. 
Brazilian Foreign Minister Antonio 
Patriota recently referred to the pact as a 
“marketing success”.11
The response to these allegations is 
three-fold. First of all, a marketing 
success is by no means a bad thing for the 
Pacific Pumas. Mexico, Colombia, Peru 
and Chile have all enjoyed the successes 
outlined in the previous chapters, but 
independently they are often overlooked, 
when they are not overshadowed by 
grisly headlines from the drug wars. If 
the Pacific Alliance can capture global 
attention on Puma improvements 
and amplify their voice in global trade 
negotiations—while perhaps attracting 
some international investment along the 
way—then the marketing success is just 
that: a success. 
Second, all four countries have 
emphasized improved infrastructure 
and export diversification. Perhaps the 
Pacific Alliance can be the catalyst to 
instigate needed upgrades. For example, 
Colombia could assume the lower-level 
manufacturing elements of a supply chain 
before shipping unfinished products 
north to Mexico where more experienced 
manufacturers can complete the good. 
Third, the true impact of the Pacific 
Alliance may not manifest itself in the real 
sector. Rather, financial sector integration 
could have the greatest impact. The 
Mercado Integrado Latinoamericano 
(MILA), a multilateral effort to integrate 
the Colombian, Peruvian and Chilean 
stock markets, evidences the Pumas’ 
ability to negotiate barrier-breaking 
financial agreements. Founded in 2010, 
MILA indicates the potential of Puma 
cooperation to deliver ambitious and hard-
fought results. Moreover, it buttresses 
the overarching Pacific Alliance strategy 
of pursuing regional cooperation in order 
to better integrate into global trade and 
capital flows.   
WHY MILA MATTERS
The Pacific Pumas may be growing, but 
prior to MILA, their bourses remained 
largely overlooked.  Outside of São 
Paulo and Mexico City, Latin American 
equity markets lack depth and breadth, 
with few companies listing publicly 
and transactions infrequent. The World 
Economic Forum’s 2012 Financial 
Development Index of 62 major markets 
found Colombia, Peru and Chile to be 
in the bottom quintile in terms of stock 
market turnover rate. Meanwhile, Mexico, 
Peru and Colombia ranked in the bottom 
quarter of stock market value to GDP.12
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MILA: A Bourse of Global Proportions
MILA Early-Harvest Agreements
MILA attests to the efficacy of the Pacific Pumas’ “early-harvest” negotiations. Rather than quixotically pursuing an immediate 
integration of the three bourses, the parties sought a step-by-step model that allowed negotiators to methodically overcome knee-
jerk opposition. By moving slowly and building linkages, proponents convinced regulators and brokerages of the three markets 
that, while they would lose complete autonomy, the end results would be a larger piece of a larger pie. 
Phase I of MILA (completed in August 2011) built a foundation for the project. This phase implemented a communications system 
between Chilean, Peruvian, and Colombian brokerages that encouraged cross-border access to the three bourses. MILA created 
the technical infrastructure for, say, a Peruvian broker to partner with a Chilean broker who could intermediate the Peruvian’s 
transactions on the Santiago stock exchange.20
The first phase of MILA also ensured soliciting rights across the three stock markets, allowing a given country to advertise domestic 
listings in participating foreign countries. Securing Phase I reforms was not easy—Peruvian reluctance to accept a flat capital 
gains tax of 5 percent delayed implementation for months 21—but by keeping expectations reasonable, Colombia, Peru and Chile 
established momentum for the project. 
Phase II negotiations, currently under way, will attempt to eliminate inefficiencies baked into Phase I reforms. For example, 
Peruvian brokerages currently pay the intermediary Chilean firms for their services. The resultant markup eats into already thin 
margins. Direct access to the Chilean bourse would be preferable. Furthermore, settlement costs remain expensive. Sticking with 
the Peruvian/Chilean example, brokers execute the exchange by selling Peruvian soles to New York financial institutions for Chilean 
pesos that are then moved to Santiago. The transfer fees can equal up to 20 percent of the transaction.22 
Successful MILA II negotiations should lead to substantial increases in trade volume while costs would decrease. Suddenly, the 
pie would be far bigger still. From this point, it is but a short jump to MILA III: full integration, in which brokers can follow screens 
in Lima and immediately place an order for a listing in Santiago.      
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Not only small and illiquid, these 
markets can appear one-dimensional: 
Chile in retail and services (32 percent of 
capitalization),13 Colombia in financials 
and energy (78 percent of capitalization)14 
and Peru in mining (53 percent of 
capitalization15).16 Such specialization 
may attract boutique investment, but it 
flies under the radar of the global herd 
seeking the “next Brazil”.
MILA could change this. Even without 
Mexico, MILA’s US$700 billion 
capitalization places the bourse second 
only to Brazil in terms of market size in 
South America. With 544 firms, MILA 
offers the largest portfolio in Latin 
America.17 The potential integration of 
the Mexican bourse in 2014 would render 
a market of global relevance.      
The Mexican Stock Exchange (Bolsa 
Mexicana de Valores or BMV) has openly 
revealed its desire to join MILA, signing 
a letter of intent to join only months after 
MILA’s introduction in 2011. For Mexican 
brokers, MILA would provide preferential 
access to the Andean listings, even if 
the BMV already has the liquidity and 
size the other Pumas lack.  In September 
of 2012, BMV concluded a technical 
feasibility study, and proposed an entry 
date of mid-2014. If the BMV does join, 
a Pacific Puma bourse would rival the 
size of Brazil’s major stock exchange, 
BOVESPA, with the key caveat that, while 
Brazil appears increasingly inclined 
towards protectionism, the Pumas have 
expressed a commitment to deconstruct 
barriers to capital flows.
With this scale come cheaper 
transactions, as well as diversified risk—
two factors that encourage an active 
market. Increased access should improve 
resource allocation, hopefully funneling 
investment to worthy firms. Moreover, 
whereas Puma markets may have been 
individually one-dimensional, combined, 
they offer a complementary mix.18 Finally, 
MILA’s backers hope international 
investors will be tantalized by this new, 
large bourse which will stand out in a 
way that, say, Lima’s bourse, alone, could 
not.19 
PUMA CUBS: PART OF A 
GROWING FAMILY
The Pacific Pumas and the Pacific 
Alliance are different entities, as the 
positive momentum and opportunity 
enjoyed by Mexico, Colombia, Peru and 
Chile extends beyond the potential of 
the inchoate bloc. Moreover, the Pacific 
Alliance has expanded beyond the 
original Pumas. Costa Rica is completing 
the procedural steps required to join as a 
member; Guatemala and Panama could 
be next. Twenty-nine other countries, 
from China to the US, from Uruguay to 
France, have signed on as observers.
 
The expanding success of the Pacific 
Alliance indicates the regional power 
accrued by the four Pumas. The bloc 
appears to be a magnet for Latin 
American countries looking for an 
alternative to the Brazilian or ALBA 
development models; nine have joined 
as members or observers.
Of course, Alliance expansion raises 
a host of concerns. Initial success can 
largely be ascribed to the small number 
of like-minded participants. Fault lines 
could emerge if and when other countries 
join the fray. Can the Pumas safely 
integrate with Panama—a haven for tax 
evasion? Can Guatemala and Honduras, 
embattled in the war on drugs, agree 
to waive visa requirements with Mexico 
and Colombia? One fears that expansion 
could lead to the stagnation that seems 
to have doomed the WTO’s Doha Round. 
But one thing is clear: The Pacific 
Alliance has established the Pumas as 
an important regional voice. The Alliance 
has reintroduced Mexico into the mix 
of Latin America’s large leaders. It 
provides brawn to Chilean brains, and it 
consolidates the voices of Colombia and 
Peru, even as these countries continue 
to consolidate internally. Marketing 
success? To a degree. Silly name? To be 
sure. But the Pacific Alliance has the 
potential to push Latin America towards 
Asian Tiger-styled economies, and Asian 
Tiger growth.
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The Pacific Pumas are emerging as 
leaders and trend setters in Latin 
America. United through the Pacific 
Alliance, they are large enough, and 
have enough gravitational pull, to 
attract smaller regional countries into 
the fold. Mexico, Colombia, Peru and 
Chile have established their model as an 
alternative to the more statist ALBA bloc 
or the more protectionist MERCOSUR 
economic pact.  
The Pumas have stressed that their 
effort is meant to facilitate regional 
integration—not to reinforce continental 
divisions. But an emerging consensus 
holds that the Pacific Alliance is a 
conscious effort to escape from beneath 
the looming shadow of Brazil, to promote 
regional integration that is more trade 
friendly than MERCOSUR, and to counter 
any residual ALBA influence. 
The Economist has heralded a “continental 
divide”, writing, “The region is falling 
behind two alternative blocs: the market-
led Pacific Alliance and the more statist 
MERCOSUR.”1 The venerable Latin 
Americanist Andres Oppenheimer 
similarly concluded that “the economic 
divide between Latin America’s Pacific 
and Atlantic blocs [has become] 
increasingly visible.”2 Grumblings from 
the 2013 MERCOSUR Social Summit in 
Montevideo suggested that elements 
of the Atlantic bloc themselves had 
succumbed to this interpretation.
To an extent, they are accurate. Puma 
policymakers believe that Brazil’s large 
population offers an internal growth 
motor that is underdeveloped in Mexico 
and Colombia, and difficult to fathom 
in Peru or Chile.3 Thus, Brazil can 
afford (or at least believes it can afford) 
protectionist trade policy. Given Brazil’s 
weighty influence in MERCOSUR, not 
to mention the influence of Argentina 
and Venezuela, the Pumas do not 
wish to align with an increasingly 
defensive bloc.4
But here is the catch: The Pacific Pumas 
would greatly benefit from a unified 
Latin America, and in many cases, 
basic economic theory suggests they 
would be perfect partners. In fact, the 
Pacific Pumas have tried to deepen 
trade relations between the two “sides”. 
However, they have directly experienced 
the unexpected and often unnecessary 
shocks associated with conducting 
business with Latin American countries 
that do not share their free market, low 
tariff, non-interventionist strategy. The 
following three examples demonstrate 
these risks.
• Chilean Energy Insecurity
Chile, a net importer of coal, oil and gas 
has long faced energy insecurity. In the 
US, a negative energy shock may lead to 
higher prices at the pump. But in Chile, 
when Argentine gas supplies dried up in 
September 2011, more than 50 percent 
of the nation experienced power outages 
that “paralyzed the country’s copper 
mines and brought Santiago grinding to 
a halt”.5
Chile cannot satisfy spiking natural gas 
demand with domestic supply.6 At best, 
Magallanes, a gas producing region 
in Chile’s deep south, can support 40 
percent of Chile’s demand for liquid 
petroleum gas, mostly limited to the 
south of the country.  Former President 
Sebastián Piñera’s support for building 
five hydroelectric plants in pristine 
Patagonia generated more hot air 
than gas: Public backlash held Piñera’s 
approval rating in the 30s and the project 
itself is now four years behind schedule.  
Thus when a natural gas bonanza 
unfolded in neighboring Bolivia and 
Argentina,7 Chile appeared perfectly 
positioned to benefit: Bolivia could 
supply Chile’s copper-mining north, 
while Argentine pipelines would feed the 
populous Chilean heartland.     
Unfortunately, it never worked out that 
way. Santiago has been dogged by the 
vicissitudes of Argentine energy policy, 
where populism has meant whimsical 
rules of the game, meddlesome 
macroeconomic policies and disputed 
contracts.8 These issues have undermined 
Chilean trust in the availability of its 
neighbor’s gas exports.9
  
Meanwhile Chile has been unable to 
reach a gas export deal with Bolivia, 
where resource protectionism and 
hostility towards Santiago have 
defined President Evo Morales’ rise, 
and he has proven reluctant to tinker 
with this strategy.10 Morales has 
stubbornly demanded coastal territory 
in exchange for a pipeline to Chile, 
and La Paz has exhausted diplomatic 
capital petitioning territorial redress in 
international courts.11 
Unable to rely on its neighbors, Chile 
has been forced to find expensive, 
intercontinental sources of energy. 
Santiago invested in expensive liquefied 
natural gas infrastructure and it imports 
supercooled gas from Trinidad and 
Tobago and Equatorial Guinea—a 
strategy expected to expand during a 
second Bachelet presidency.12
•  Colombia & Venezuela:  
The Politics of Trade
For Colombia, anxious to enlarge a 
manufacturing export portfolio, proximity 
to Venezuela offers opportunity. 
With Venezuelan production geared 
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overwhelmingly towards oil, the country 
must import just about everything 
else. Moreover, certain Colombian and 
Venezuelan comparative advantages 
appear complementary, a fact not lost on 
a Colombia that seeks deeper integration 
into regional supply chains. Hydrocarbon 
derivatives readily abundant in Venezuela 
such as polyethylene and ethylene, can 
be converted into plastic goods such as 
polystyrenes, tubes, hoses and resins 
in Colombia.13
Between 2000 and 2008, Colombian 
exports to Venezuela nearly quadrupled 
in terms of value. The bulk of these 
exports were of manufactured goods: 
In both 2007 and 2008, eight of the top 
ten Colombian exports to Venezuela 
were non-commodities, such as vehicles 
and vehicle parts, textiles and clothing 
accessories, plastics, machinery and 
electrical equipment.14 For the optimist, 
this relationship offered proof of 
Colombia’s potential beyond commodity 
exports, and Bogotá hoped to use it as 
a foundation to hone manufacturing 
efficiencies for global markets.15   
Unfortunately, the inherent risk in 
partnering with a boisterously populist 
neighbor proved far greater than 
the sheer economics would suggest. 
Colombian-Venezuelan ties began to 
strain in the mid-2000s when Bogotá’s 
trade negotiations with the US 
precipitated Venezuela’s exit from the 
Andean Community of Nations (CAN). 
The diplomatic relationship rapidly 
deteriorated, lost amid macho posturing 
between Colombian President Álvaro 
Uribe and Venezuelan President Hugo 
Chávez, and it was severed in July of 2009 
when the extent of US military presence 
in Colombia became public. On a whim, 
Chávez moved to replace Colombian 
trade with imports from Argentina 
and Brazil.
For a man oft-criticized for an inability 
to match rhetoric with results, Chávez 
made good on this threat. Between 
2008 and 2010, bilateral trade fell from 
US$7.29 billion to US$1.68 billion,16 
and Colombian exports to Venezuela 
plummeted from 18 percent to 3.6 
percent of total exports.17 The losses hurt 
precisely the sectors Colombia hoped 
would thrive: Manufacturing exports 
tumbled, and Colombia’s total exports 
of textiles dropped by more than half. 
According to one statistical analysis, the 
trade breakdown cost Colombia a full 
percent of real GDP growth in 2009.18         
The clear message for Colombian 
technocrats and businessmen was that, 
when doing business with Atlantic-Latin 
America, all the work required to put an 
economy on a successful track can be 
derailed when a stubborn paisa bumps 
into a bombastic llanero. Colombia 
would be happy to rekindle trade with 
Venezuela, and by some accounts, 
their commerce has rebounded in the 
Santos – Maduro era.19 Nevertheless, 
Bogotá views the relationship with less 
enthusiasm, and the experience has 
influenced Colombia’s desire to pursue 
intercontinental ties.20
•  Mexican Car Exports and 
MERCOSUR
Even Mexico, which in 2011 sent more 
than 83 percent of its exports north to 
the US and Canada,21 has been unable 
to avoid the pitfalls of South American 
protectionism. The Complementación 
Económica No. 55 (ACE No. 55), signed 
between Mexico and MERCOSUR in 
2002, supposedly ensured free trade in 
automobiles among the participants. For 
Mexico, the deal offered an opportunity 
to leverage existing economies of scale: 
Since the advent of NAFTA in 1994, Mexico 
had attracted international automobile 
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Nicaragua: 8 (124)
Colombia: 3 (43)
Ecuador: 10 (135)
Peru: 2 (42)
Bolivia: 11 (162)
Chile: 1 (34)
Argentina: 9 (126)
Uruguay: 5 (88)
Paraguay: 6 (109)
Venezula: 12 (181)
Cuba: n/a
Brazil: 7 (116)
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World Bank’s 2014 Ease of Doing 
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firms,22 lured by an opportunity to export 
cheaply north across the Rio Grande. 
ACE No. 55 opened South American 
markets to Mexican exports just as Brazil’s 
expanding middle class portended a 
boom in automobile demand. Mexico 
initially specialized in exporting larger 
vehicles to Brazil, while Brazil exported 
smaller ones to Mexico.23 However, as 
footloose capital and strong commodity 
prices led to appreciation of the Brazilian 
real, Mexican exporters established the 
upper hand: Their cars sold for a fraction 
of the price of similar, or in some cases, 
the same, models made in Brazil.24 Just 
between 2009 and 2011, Mexican unit 
exports to Brazil increased by 152 percent, 
generating US$2.1 billion revenue and a 
US$696 million bilateral trade surplus.25
For Mexico, these auto exports 
represented reintegration into South 
American trade. Mexico’s bleak 
experience in 2008 and 2009, sucked into 
the Great Recession by the United States, 
laid bare the vulnerability of relying too 
heavily on one major trade partner.26 
Success with Brazil affirmed beliefs that 
Mexico could be a hub for manufactured 
goods sold south, just as it is a hub for 
goods exported north. For Mexico, the 
relationship represented the future the 
Pumas are building towards.
Until it didn’t. In September 2011, 
Brazil responded to its increasingly 
uncompetitive auto industry by slapping 
a 30 percent import charge on motor 
vehicles and parts. ACE No. 55 should 
have protected Mexican vehicles 
from facing this tariff, but by February 
2012, President Dilma Rousseff’s 
administration moved to “restructure” 
the trade agreement. In order to save any 
semblance of the deal, Mexico accepted 
a quota system that would limit auto 
exports to Brazil to US$1.45 billion in the 
first year, and US$1.56 and US$1.64 billion 
in the next two years. Furthermore, rules 
of regional content were slated to jump 
from 30 to 40 percent within five years.27  
Both measures stung. The quota resulted 
in a 26 percent revenue reduction, and 
Mexican light vehicle exports to Brazil 
dropped 72 percent in February 2013. 
With Argentina imposing comparable 
restrictions, Mexican auto exports to 
Latin America declined 50 percent in 
early 2013.28 The domestic content 
rule challenged what Mexico viewed 
as seamless integration into the 
international automobile parts supply 
chain—precisely the style of integration 
the Pumas have actively sought.   
A PUMA MUST ROAM
The insinuation that Pacific and Atlantic 
Latin America have split into two hostile 
camps is not exactly accurate. Rather, the 
Pacific Pumas have directly experienced 
the unexpected and often unnecessary 
shocks associated with conducting 
business with Latin American countries 
that do not share their free market 
strategy. They have apparently learned 
their lesson, and they will avoid lurking 
puma traps.
It is much less painful to hang out with 
the Asian Tigers.   
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The United States and Europe have forged 
a remarkably successful alliance over the 
last seventy years. The trans-Atlantic 
partners have helped power global 
growth and innovation while developing 
increasingly inclusive democracies. 
Together, the US and EU still account 
for over 48 percent of global GDP. They 
continue to buttress the international 
system, acting as major funders and 
stakeholders of the United Nations, 
the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund.1
Alone, however, the US and EU will 
struggle to match the success of the last 
seven decades in the next seven decades. 
Following the Great Recession of 2008 
and the Euro crisis of 2010, trans-Atlantic 
growth has sputtered, and emerging 
markets have assumed an increasingly 
important role in keeping the global 
economy afloat. A US and EU economic 
rebound is perhaps contingent upon 
linking into emerging-market growth. 
Thankfully, between the trans-Atlantic’s 
advanced technology and sophisticated 
service sectors, they have the comparative 
advantages to do so.
Yet if global economic balances are 
shifting, the identity of new players 
remains unclear. The BRICs, for example, 
offer four distinct development paths, 
none of which are particularly conducive 
to trans-Atlantic political and economic 
preferences. In this light, Mexico, 
Colombia, Peru and Chile are valuable 
strategic partners.  
The Pacific Pumas represent an emerging-
market bloc committed to economic and 
democratic policies in-line with those of 
the US and the EU. If the Pacific Alliance 
can continue to expand in Latin America, 
then much of the Western Hemisphere 
will be aligned with the trans-Atlantic 
model. For the US, the Pumas represent 
a potential partner in the Americas: the 
five countries account for more than half 
of the hemisphere’s population, and 
upwards of 75 percent of its GDP.2 For the 
EU, the Pumas represent access to high 
growth, investor-friendly (and Europe-
friendly) markets, with a window to East 
Asia to boot. 
Together, the US, EU and Pacific Pumas 
can set the foundation for an enlarged 
trans-Atlantic bloc prepared to negotiate 
the opportunities and challenges of a 
Pacific century. 
THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN 
LEADERSHIP
On November 19, 2013, US Secretary 
of State John Kerry addressed a private 
audience at the Organization of American 
States’ Hall of Flags and Heroes, where 
he underscored the end of the Monroe 
Doctrine and a future of Pan-American 
collaboration as equals. Though his 
words were warmly received, Secretary 
Kerry did not specify just who he expected 
to emerge as the US’s key partner in 
the region. 
The US has vacillated between cautious 
optimism, ambivalence and weariness 
regarding the rise of Brazil.3 Other 
large Latin American countries such as 
Venezuela or Argentina seem unlikely 
to actively cooperate with the US in the 
near term. Puma cubs such as Uruguay 
or Costa Rica are simply too small to act 
as equal partners with the US, fraternal 
rhetoric notwithstanding. 
It is the Pacific Pumas, both independently 
and collectively as the Pacific Alliance, 
that stand to develop as the US’s strategic 
partners in the region. Whether by design 
or happenstance, the Pumas are pursuing 
precisely the open market, private sector-
led, democratically governed development 
model Washington is anxious to entrench 
as the global standard. That the Pumas are 
adopting this model without heavy-handed 
prodding from the US is all the better, at 
least from Washington’s perspective.
For US policymakers, the question 
becomes how to facilitate this 
momentum without poisoning the well. 
Former Brazilian President Lula da Silva 
has already criticized the Pacific Alliance 
as a rehashing of the Washington 
Consensus—still a politically toxic term 
in the region.4 If ALBA or MERCOSUR 
countries—not to mention opposition 
figures within the Pumas—can paint 
the Alliance’s free-trade, pro-business 
policies as lackeyed deference to the US, 
any momentum could be derailed.  
Cognizant of this, Washington has sought 
to subtly support the Pumas while 
maintaining a light footprint. In July 2013, 
the US joined the Pacific Alliance as an 
observer. Though the US may eventually 
become a member, for now the Obama 
Administration appears content with 
letting the Alliance mature under its own 
auspices. Outside of the spotlight, the 
US has assisted Puma integration, with 
the Treasury Department chipping in 
technical support on the combined stock 
market of MILA.  
The US remains a fundamentally 
important trade partner for the Pumas. 
Since 2002 Mexico has sent an annual 
average of 82 percent of its exports to 
the US, while more than 50 percent of 
Mexican imports routinely arrive from 
its northern neighbor. Colombia shipped 
an annual average of 38.56 percent of 
its exports to the US between 2010 and 
2012; no other country has received an 
average of more than five percent of 
Colombian exports.5  China surpassed the 
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US to become Chile’s top trading partner 
in 2008, and Peru’s top trading partner in 
2011, but the US remains a close second 
for both countries. 
Generally speaking, the US exports 
machinery, fuel, vehicles and agricultural 
goods in exchange for Puma commodities, 
both agricultural and mineral. Mexico 
stands as a key exception to this trend: 
Four of its five largest export categories 
to the US in 2012 were manufactured 
goods (electrical machinery, vehicles, 
machinery, and optic and medical 
instruments).6 This US demand is a major 
reason manufactured goods accounted 
for more than 70 percent of Mexican 
exports in 2012.
The Pacific Pumas and the US have used 
bilateral and multilateral agreements 
to facilitate their trade, a process that 
began with NAFTA in 1994 (discussed in 
Chapter 4 of this report). Eric Farnsworth, 
Vice-President of the Council of the 
Americas, argues that by linking these 
preexisting agreements with the Pacific 
Alliance agreements, the participants can 
reinvigorate the stalled Free Trade Area 
of the Americas,7 only this time limiting 
participation to what Peterson Institute 
economist Barbara Kotschwar calls “the 
coalition of the willing”.8
Washington has also invited Puma 
representatives to help set standards 
for the future rounds of global trade 
dialogues. Three of the Pumas are 
active participants in the US-led TPP 
negotiations. Washington may maintain 
a low-profile in the Pacific Alliance—for 
example the US did not send a delegation 
to the group’s 7th Summit in February of 
2014—but this should not be interpreted 
as disinterest. The US is encouraged 
by the Alliance’s progress, and does 
not want to emerge as a distraction. 
Rather, as a friendly bloc in the Western 
Hemisphere, the United States hopes to 
feature the Pacific Alliance as part of its 
vaunted pivot to the Pacific.
 
EUROPE AND THE PUMAS: 
OLD FRIENDS WITH NEW 
BENEFITS
The Pacific Pumas have also captured 
Europe’s attention: Deutsche Bank 
described the four countries as “Latin 
America’s new stars”,9 while European 
Council President Herman van Rompuy 
referred to the Pacific Alliance as “a very 
promising initiative…that will allow us 
to team up at the multilateral level to 
promote our common vision on trade and 
economic cooperation”.10 The German 
Business Association of Latin America 
dedicated its entire Latin America Day 
conference to the Alliance in 2013.
 
France, Germany, Italy, Portugal, Spain, 
Switzerland and the United Kingdom 
have all joined the Pacific Alliance as 
observers, and the Pumas already have 
bilateral FTAs with the EU (all while 
an EU-MERCOSUR trade agreement 
appears increasingly unlikely). 
The allure of the Pumas is clear: For 
the eurozone to overcome its malaise, 
it must exploit the existing economic 
infrastructure connecting the old world to 
emerging markets. The EU is particularly 
suited to link into Latin American 
growth. Despite a turbulent history, the 
longstanding ties and cultural similarities 
between the two are currently assets to 
the relationship. European foreign direct 
investment, for example, can appear 
less jarring than Chinese or even US 
direct investment.  
A closer look at trade and investment 
patterns reveals that new opportunities 
are on the horizon for Puma – 
EU relations. 
• EU-Puma Trade:
While EU bilateral trade with Mexico, 
Colombia, Peru and Chile may be 
underwhelming, together, the Pumas are 
the EU’s eighth largest trading partner. 
EU - Puma commerce outpaces trade 
between the EU and Brazil, as well as 
the EU and India.11 Meanwhile, the EU is 
the Pumas’ third largest trading partner 
(behind only the US and China), the 
second largest importer of Puma goods, 
and the third largest exporter to the four 
Latin American countries.12 
Puma trade with the EU typically 
follows a pattern of commodities-for-
manufactured goods. In 2012, over three 
quarters of EU exports to the Pumas were 
of manufactured goods and machinery, 
while over three quarters of Peruvian and 
Colombian exports to the EU consisted of 
crude materials, minerals and animals.13 
Chile and Mexico have had more success 
exporting manufactured goods to Europe, 
though copper typically accounts for 55 
percent of Chilean exports to the region.14
Much like Puma trade with East Asia, 
the relationship with the EU is both 
advantageous, because the two regions 
have generally compatible spheres of 
comparative advantage, and threatening, 
as it further entrenches the Pumas in 
commodity production. Unlike with East 
Asia, however, European manufacturing 
exports tend to be higher-end, and 
thus often do not directly compete with 
Puma products. 
• EU- Puma Investment
The European Union is already the 
largest foreign direct investor in Latin 
America. While the bulk of this financing 
flows to the mining and hydrocarbon 
sectors, EU firms account for a large 
share of regional manufacturing and 
development investing as well. 
Between German electronics, French 
chemicals, Spanish finance and 
Italian telecommunications, EU firms 
pursue a varied portfolio of ventures 
in Latin America that fit Pumas’ goals 
of diversification.15  
EU firms have also demonstrated a 
willingness to invest in “greenfield” 
manufacturing projects, as opposed to 
simply purchasing existing operations. 
Between 2003 and 2007, roughly 45 
percent of new manufacturing FDI in 
Latin America came from the EU, up 
from 34 percent between 2003 through 
2006. By comparison, Asia’s share held at 
roughly 20 percent from 2003 to 2011.16
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Moving forward, the Pacific Pumas 
will become increasingly attractive 
investment destinations for European 
firms. Mexico, Colombia, Peru and 
Chile can generate a rate of return 
difficult to realize in Europe, and they 
offer protection of investment not 
easily attained in many other emerging 
markets: EU members have already been 
stung by populist appropriations in non-
Puma Latin America, most recently in 
Argentina and Bolivia.17
Finally, EU investors have demonstrated 
a clear preference for integrated Latin 
American countries (MERCOSUR and 
NAFTA countries received about 90 
percent of regional EU FDI between 
2006 and 201018), as foreign firms seek 
to establish export-efficient bases 
within the region. The Lateinamerika 
Verein, a network of German businesses 
active in Latin America, has already 
observed increased German appetite 
for investment in Puma countries given 
the subsequent ease of exporting within 
the Alliance.19
A TRANS-ATLANTIC TRIANGLE
An enlarged trans-Atlantic relationship 
should benefit all sides. For the US, the 
Pumas could become reliable allies in 
hemispheric leadership. For the EU, 
the Pumas represent an economically 
growing, politically stable region with 
close ties to Europe. For the Pumas, ties 
to the EU and US offer access to influence 
and capital. 
The EU and US can indicate their interest 
in incorporating the Pacific Pumas by 
addressing Puma apprehension over 
TTIP. The Pumas are not privy to TTIP 
negotiations, but the pact could affect 
the four Latin American countries, 
especially Mexico.  
A Bertelsmann Stiftung and IFO Institute 
study forecasts that a comprehensive 
TTIP agreement could result in a decline 
of Latin American exports to both trans-
Atlantic partners. Mexico, a country 
which relies on trade with the US, 
could see their exports to the US shrink 
by 16.04 percent. All told, the study 
concludes that TTIP could cost Mexico, 
Colombia, Peru and Chile 7.2, 2.6, 2.2 and 
5.6 percent of per capita gross national 
income respectively.20 
The EU and US are reluctant to expand 
TTIP negotiations. Closing an FTA 
between 29 different counties is already 
rather complicated, and any expansion 
in the Western Hemisphere could imply 
expansion on the European side. Turkey, 
for example, shares Mexico’s concern 
over not being at the table. 
Nevertheless, the traditional trans-
Atlantic partners can take steps to avoid 
alienating the Pacific Pumas. Given that 
tariffs are already low between the EU 
and US, the importance of TTIP lies in 
harmonizing regulations. The EU and US 
can seek bilateral modifications in their 
pacts with Mexico, Colombia, Peru and 
Chile to ensure that their agreements 
are up to date and in-line with TTIP 
standards. Meanwhile, if the Pumas can 
successfully align the standards of the 
Pacific Alliance with TTIP, this could help 
prepare Mexico, Colombia, Peru and 
Chile to act as partners and participants 
in 21st century trans-Atlantic leadership.
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Europe and the US must be careful to not alienate 
regional trade partners, such as the Pumas, 
who are not privy to TTIP negotiations.
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For the Pacific Pumas, China represents 
both an opportunity and a threat. 
Chinese commodity demand sparks 
growth and fills central bank coffers in 
South America, but it also threatens 
to stymie export diversification. 
Any Chinese slowdown could burst 
commodity prices, thus exposing a Puma 
vulnerability. Investment from the East 
offers opportunity at a time when OECD 
capital can seem scarce. But what strings 
come attached with Chinese FDI, and 
which sectors will be favored? 
Meanwhile, Chinese manufactured 
goods offer consumption opportunities 
for the Pumas’ newfound middle classes, 
but local producers may struggle to 
compete on their own home turf. That 
said, if the Pumas could leverage their 
own manufacturing, China represents a 
massive market embedded in the Pacific’s 
intertwined trade routes. In short, the 
Pumas’ ability to take advantage of their 
current opportunity may hinge upon 
their success in harnessing the power of 
the Dragon. 
CHINA IN LATIN AMERICA
China has two prominent goals in Latin 
America: resource security and market 
expansion. The Pacific Pumas pique 
China’s interest on both accounts.  From 
oil to zinc to copper, the Pumas are richly 
endowed in the commodities China 
needs to build 21st century super-cities. 
This Chinese demand has bid up the 
price of commodities that pushed Puma 
growth, birthing a new middle class 
which could, in turn, afford to purchase 
manufactured goods from China.
Since the turn of the century, the 
relationship has unfolded in two major 
phases. The first, from 2000 to 2007, 
featured explosive trade growth. The 
second phase, beginning roughly in 2007, 
centers on increased Chinese foreign 
direct investment (FDI) throughout the 
region. The dynamics of each phase are 
considered in turn:
• Trade
China’s ascension to the WTO in 2001 
sparked a trade renaissance. While 
much of the world feared an onslaught 
of cheap manufactured goods, for South 
America the emergence of the Dragon 
has had spectacular short-term benefits. 
China faces a resource dearth: outside of 
people and coal, it must import nearly all 
its resource inputs, inputs that exist in 
abundance in Latin America. Overall, in 
the first decade of 2000s, trade between 
the People’s Republic of China and Latin 
America ballooned from US$10 billion to 
US$180.2 billion.1 Chinese GDP growth 
averaged 11.42 percent from 2005 to 
2009, and during those years, Chinese 
imports from Latin America increased by 
an annual average of 22.8 percent.2 
This trade is at once both balanced and 
skewed.  In South America, Chinese 
imports have closely tracked exports, 
with years of meager South American 
surpluses following a few years of minor 
Chinese surpluses (Mexico and Central 
America, on the other hand, trade at a 
notable deficit with China). Nevertheless, 
the trade portfolios are profoundly 
lopsided. In 2009, manufactured goods 
accounted for 99.2 percent of Latin 
American imports from China.3 That 
same year, agricultural and mining goods 
comprised 83 percent of Latin American 
exports to China.4
• Foreign Direct Investment
Foreign Direct Investment represents 
a second thrust of Chinese economic 
activity in Latin America. Chinese FDI 
has moved from around 2.3 percent of 
GDP in 2000 to around 5.5 percent of 
GDP today—representing tens of billions 
of dollars in increases.5 Between 2000 
and 2011, China directed just over 11 
percent of these funds towards Latin 
America, making the region the second 
largest recipient of Chinese FDI behind 
Hong Kong.6
 
As with trade, Chinese FDI represents 
both an opportunity and a challenge for 
the Pacific Pumas. All four Pumas suffer 
an infrastructure deficit—Colombia and 
Peru acutely so. China has demonstrated 
a willingness to invest in infrastructure 
upgrades. However, 90 percent of Chinese 
FDI in Latin America is geared towards 
exploiting and exporting raw materials,7 
threatening to further plant the Pumas 
in the resource-reliance rut that they are 
fighting their way out of. 
THE PUMA AND THE DRAGON
While the Pacific Alliance bloc may help 
the Pumas interface with the East, the 
opportunities and challenges are distinct 
for Mexico, Colombia, Peru and Chile. As 
a result, each Puma’s relationship with 
China is best reviewed individually. 
CHILE AND CHINA:  
A MODEL FOR THE PUMAS? 
Chile is the world’s largest producer 
of copper. China is the world’s leading 
copper importer and consumer. It stands 
to reason that sparks would fly between 
them. 
In 2001, the year China joined the WTO, 
Chilean exports to the Dragon stood 
at US$1.30 billion; a mere 32 percent 
of Chilean exports to the US. By 2006, 
Chilean exports to China had more than 
quadrupled. Five years later, in 2011, 
China had emerged as Chile’s number 
one trading partner, importing US$20.58 
billion worth of goods—more than 16 
times the 2001 figure. 
Harnessing the Dragon8
4 0
Commodities compose the bulk of these 
exports: In 2010, 67 percent of Chilean 
exports to China were of copper related 
materials alone. Chile’s dual challenges 
in terms of harnessing the Dragon are, 
on the one hand, diversifying its export 
portfolio while, on the other, ensuring 
against the price vulnerability inherent 
in having one major consumer for one 
particular product. 
Chile, the most developed Puma, 
appears to command a high level of 
respect from China. For example, in 
February 2013, the state-controlled China 
Minmetals Corporation acquiesced to 
Chilean requests to restructure a 15-
year copper deal.8 That contract, based 
on 2006 copper spot prices of US$1.50 
a pound, clearly favored China as then-
current prices hovered between US$3 
and US$4 per pound. In contrast to the 
hard line Chinese firms have at times 
taken elsewhere, Minmetals agreed to 
restructure the contract to bring it closer 
in line with market values.9      
Meanwhile, Chile has used trade 
negotiations with China to attract 
attention beyond traditional exports. 
The 2005 FTA dialogues highlighted non-
trade issues, such as labor cooperation, 
security and environmental standards. 
A subsequent 2008 service-sector 
supplement to the FTA represented 
the first of its kind between China and 
Latin America, with Chilean engineers, 
architects and lawyers participating in 
drafting the pact.10 
Both in terms of commodity deals and 
portfolio expansion, China appears 
willing to work with Chile as a partner. 
In this sense, the relationship can be a 
model for the other Pumas. 
PERU AND CHINA:
HARNESSING FOREIGN  
DIRECT INVESTMENT 
Peru, Latin America’s leading producer of 
gold, lead, silver tellurium, tin, and zinc,11 
has emerged as a prominent destination 
for Chinese mining FDI, receiving US$5 
billion in investments between 2003 and 
2011. The Andean country is now the 
second biggest Latin American recipient 
of Chinese mining FDI, and the fourth 
biggest globally.12 
The relationship has been tumultuous, 
marked by high profit margins and 
production as well as frequent labor 
stoppages and allegations of safety and 
environmental negligence. It is also 
expected to expand. Peruvian Finance 
Minister Miguel Castilla forecasts 
that Chinese investment could grow 
exponentially in the next few years, 
hitting upwards of US$20 billion 
by 2018.13
Lima can neither afford to discourage 
this investment nor to let Chinese 
mining firms run roughshod over 
domestic regulations. Harnessing 
Chinese investment will thus be crucial 
to Peruvian emergence. 
The Hierro Peru iron mine, purchased 
by the state-owned Shougang Group 
in 1992, stands as China’s seminal 
investment in the country.14 Having now 
celebrated its 21st anniversary, Shougang 
Hierro Peru has proven both profitable 
and controversial. Ranked the No. 1 
business in Latin America in 2010 by 
the Latin Business Chronicle, the iron ore 
giant grew 123.9 percent in 2010, while 
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profits reached US$700 million—a 456.1 
percent increase over the 2009 value.15 
However, the firm has been plagued by 
labor disputes and accusations of abuse 
related to pay and health conditions.16 
Labor strikes occurred intermittently 
in the early 2000s, and annually 
since 2008, with clashes occasionally 
turning violent.17    
So what is Peru to do? It must consolidate, 
clarify and strengthen its regulatory 
approach with Chinese state-owned 
enterprises. Lima can and must assume a 
more assertive role in negotiating terms 
and expectations with Chinese investors. 
Shougang’s environmental violations 
may have as much to do with lax oversight 
as with Chinese malfeasance, and the 
company’s use of lightly regulated, low-
wage subcontractors to skirt minimum 
wage regulations reflects loopholes in 
Peruvian law as much as anything else.18
As Peru matures, the nature of Chinese 
investment may be improving. In 2008, 
Chinalco, the state-owned aluminum 
corporation of China, purchased the 
Peruvian Toromocho mine for US$2.2 
billion. Rather than importing Chinese 
labor, Chinalco has hired locally. It has 
also implemented community outreach 
programs, and worked with third-party 
advisors to establish an environmental 
management system. The Toromocho 
mine is subject to revised environmental 
standards, and Chinalco is investing 
upwards of US$5 billion in project 
infrastructure up front.19   
Nevertheless, controversy remains 
likely as Chinalco must “relocate” 5,000 
people living on the site of the mine. This 
delicate process has already engendered 
blowback. How this relocation is handled 
may well indicate Peru’s progress in 
harnessing Chinese investment.    
MEXICO AND CHINA:  
A HEALTHY COMPETITION  
Mexico’s relationship with China is 
uniquely competitive among the Pumas. 
Since the creation of the maquiladora 
sector south of the Rio Grande in the 
1960s, Mexico has geared its economy 
towards cheap, manufactured goods, 
exported predominantly to the United 
States. Therefore Mexico viewed China’s 
2001 ascension to the WTO with alarm. 
The Chinese threat was twofold: On the 
one hand cheap Chinese manufactured 
goods could siphon US market share 
away from the maquiladoras. On the other 
hand, Chinese manufactures could 
swamp the Mexican domestic market. 
Statistics corroborated Mexico’s 
concerns. China, which competes directly 
with Mexico on twelve of the latter’s 20 
main export-sectors to the US, surpassed 
Mexico in 2003 to become the number 
two exporter to the US behind Canada.20 
By 2007, Chinese exports to the US 
surpassed Mexico’s by almost 60 percent. 
In terms of competition for the Mexican 
market, what was a US$2.39 billion 
Mexican trade deficit to China in 2000 
ballooned to US$38.72 billion deficit 
by 2010.21
However, in a comeback that highlights 
the potential of the Pumas, Mexico has 
rapidly regained its competitiveness, 
especially in terms of exports to the US. 
In 2005, Mexican manufacturing exports 
had dipped to 11 percent of US imports. 
By 2012 that number had increased to 
14.4 percent, surpassing previous highs.22 
Increased efficiency, a web of trade 
agreements and the elimination of many 
non-tariff trade barriers have factored 
in this reemergence. Increased Chinese 
wages, compared with generally stagnant 
Mexican wages, have also played a role.23 
While a maquiladora worker in Juarez may 
balk at the notion that her country is 
more competitive because her wage has 
flatlined, demographics suggest that 
Mexican labor will remain abundant 
and cheap, at least through the next 
two decades.
Having successfully fended off (or at 
least survived) competition at the nadir 
of Chinese wages, Mexico may now 
view China as an opportunity for market 
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expansion, and not just as a threat. 
Whether Mexican automobiles can 
penetrate the Chinese market remains 
to be seen, but some firms are willing to 
pay to find out. Fiat is already shipping 
Mexican Fiat 500s to China, and Audi is 
considering a similar strategy.24 
Moreover, as Chinese consumption 
expands, demand increases for luxury 
goods—especially those perceived 
as popular in the West. For Mexico, 
exports that fit this bill include high-
end tequila, mescal, pork and even 
wine. These operations are generally 
small to mid-sized enterprises owned 
by Mexicans, as opposed to the 
multinational manufacturers. With time 
and experience, Mexican exporters may 
begin to penetrate China, thus opening 
a new avenue for growth and diversifying 
away from the US.
COLOMBIA AND CHINA: 
WHAT MIGHT BE
Colombia is an Andean outlier with 
regards to China. With commodities 
making up more than 60 percent of the 
country’s global exports, Colombia would 
seem destined to link into the same 
Chinese-Latin American trade flows that 
have sparked continental growth. 
Yet it has not. Colombia remains far more 
tethered to the US than to China. As of 
2011, roughly 40 percent of Colombian 
exports went to the US, while only three 
percent shipped west to China.25 In terms 
of commodities, the numbers are even 
more skewed. In 2010 the US received 
47.2 percent of Colombian commodities, 
while China imported 5.2 percent, only 
slightly more than what Colombia sent 
to Switzerland. 
At the moment, Colombia does not 
have the infrastructure required to 
compete with its commodity-producing 
neighbors in order to export to China. 
Buenaventura, Colombia’s largest Pacific 
Port, lacks the capacity to process heavy 
trade. Its draft is not deep enough for 
large vessels, the town itself is too small, 
and the linkages to Cali (the nearest big 
city) are underdeveloped. It is actually 
more cost-efficient to take the longer 
Caribbean route and pay passage through 
the Panama Canal. 
Chinese investment in Colombia has 
also run comparatively low: Of the US$15 
billion that China invested in Latin 
America in 2010, only US$6.2 million 
landed in Colombia.26 China plays an 
emerging role in Colombia’s extractive 
industries, notably in hydrocarbons, 
but ambitious infrastructure projects, 
announced to great fanfare, have 
amounted to little. Chinese investors 
have been unable to build the 120 
kilometer road connecting Buenaventura 
to Bugo, let alone the vaunted “land 
canal” that would cut through Colombia. 
Nevertheless, Colombia’s underwhelming 
economic ties with China may actually be 
a reason for optimism. Puma skeptics are 
quick to posit that 21st century growth 
stems from Chinese demand, and thus, 
is vulnerable to a Chinese slowdown. 
Colombia has increased exports and 
growth without Chinese demand. The 
country has averaged 4.67 percent growth 
over the last decade—one wonders 
what that figure might have been had it 
enjoyed deeper trade ties with China.27 
If anything, Colombia’s march towards 
internal peace will allow for infrastructure 
upgrades that, in turn, will allow for 
increased trade with China, thus building 
on already strong growth figures.    
AN OCEAN OF OPPORTUNITY 
While each Puma faces different 
challenges regarding China, each has 
developed knowledge and experience 
useful to the others. Chile has quietly 
engaged China almost as a partner—a 
rarity for an emerging market. Mexico 
has proven that the Pumas can compete 
with the Dragon. Peru has forged a path 
towards both encouraging and regulating 
Chinese investment. Colombia, which 
hopes to increase trade with and 
investment from China, can learn 
much from the Chilean, Mexican and 
Peruvian experiences. 
The Pumas should not discourage or 
fear China, and the Pacific Alliance’s 
overtures to Asia suggest that they have 
no intention of doing either. Rather, by 
harnessing the Dragon and leveraging 
China’s need for resources, expect the 
Pumas to channel the relationship 
towards the opportunities, and away 
from the threats.
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Mexico, Colombia, Peru and Chile have made noteworthy macroeconomic and democratic advancements in the 21st century. They 
have created a solid foundation for development precisely as the greater Pacific stands to emerge as a focal point of global growth. 
That the four countries have shared this “awakening” gives them the opportunity to join forces, exponentially increasing the group’s 
global impact and potential.
Yet persistent shortcomings could still derail this progress. Systemic corruption, violence, commodity reliance, and inequality are 
not exactly new phenomena for the four countries. Will the Pacific Pumas finally be able to exorcise these demons? Or are the trends 
outlined in this document simply symptomatic of a boom period, anticipating an eventual bust—a cycle so familiar in Latin America?
The answer remains to be seen, but one thing is clear: The Pacific Pumas have an opportunity.
They have an opportunity to entrench stable macroeconomic systems; to pursue levelheaded democratic governance; to eradicate 
extreme poverty; the opportunity to link into international trade networks and to prove that globalization can be a tool to address 
inequality. 
United in the Pacific Alliance, the Pumas have the opportunity to emerge as regional leaders and flag bearers for Latin American 
integration; they have the opportunity to join a 21st century trans-Atlantic community that combines the experience and know-how 
of the US and EU with the growth potential of emerging markets. In a world that could see increased regionalism, the Pumas have the 
opportunity to be strategic partners to the United States, Europe and East Asia. 
How the Pumas capitalize on this opportunity cannot necessarily be measured by any given year’s growth statistics. Similarly, protests 
in Chile, setbacks in the Colombian peace process, drug violence in Mexico or falling copper prices in Peru do not necessarily portend 
a dream deferred. In many cases, these are natural tensions inherent to maturing emerging markets.  
Ultimately, the Pumas’ success should be measured in terms of creating and maintaining institutions worthy of the developed world 
while sustaining the growth potential and dynamism of emerging markets. Puma governments must tackle difficult reforms, even at 
the cost of some short-term growth, in order to remove long-term bottlenecks on their economies. In terms of regional leadership, 
the Pumas’ success should not be based on how many countries join the Pacific Alliance, but rather the depth and breadth of Alliance 
integration. In terms of global linkages, the Pumas must demonstrate an ability to turn free trade agreements on paper into more 
and better jobs in practice. 
 
Mexico, Colombia, Peru and Chile do not need to be perfect, nor will they be. But if they can continue their positive momentum, they 
will blaze a trail for the Pumas of Latin America to run with the Tigers of the East.
Prepared to Pounce?
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